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INTRODUCTION 
HE commercial speech doctrine in First Amendment jurisprudence 
has frequently been criticized and is recognized as a contested, prob-
lematic, and shifting landscape. Despite the critique within constitutional 
law scholarship more broadly, intellectual property (“IP”) law has not 
only embraced the differential treatment of commercial speech, but also 
has done so in ways that disfavor a much broader swath of speech than 
traditional commercial speech doctrine allows. The different bodies of 
IP law each define what is meant by “commercial” differently, and even 
within the same area of IP law there is confusion as to what role com-
merciality should play. Such disparities not only create doctrinal confu-
sion and incoherence, but also demonstrate that distinctions between 
commercial and noncommercial speech are challenging to make and of-
ten difficult to justify, especially when broadened to distinctions be-
tween commercial and noncommercial uses—a distinction that usually 
turns on whether uses are made for financial gain. Thus far, IP laws and 
IP scholarship have provided no developed framework to answer the 
most basic questions of when commerciality matters for establishing 
rights or liability, nor any normative basis for distinguishing uses on 
T 
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those grounds. This project is the first step in addressing this troubled 
state of affairs. 
Several recent disputes highlight the challenging questions of whether 
we should treat commercial uses differently, and, if so, under what cir-
cumstances. Consider the magazine Sports Illustrated’s publication of a 
commemorative issue devoted entirely to celebrating the basketball star 
Michael Jordan and his induction into the NBA Hall of Fame. Sports Il-
lustrated offered two supermarkets free one-page spreads in exchange 
for selling and prominently featuring the magazine in their stores. Each 
of the supermarkets created congratulatory messages and images to cel-
ebrate Jordan’s induction. Jordan sued the supermarkets for false en-
dorsement (under the Lanham Act) and for violating his right of publici-
ty (under Illinois law). The case against one of the supermarkets, Jewel-
Osco, was appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. 
The supermarket’s congratulatory spread included the market’s slogan—
“Good things are just around the corner”—but did not otherwise refer to 
its stores or encourage any particular transaction. Jordan’s name ap-
peared once in a sentence referring to his “elevation in the Basketball 
Hall of Fame,” and the page included a picture of sneakers with Jordan’s 
number (23) on each shoe’s tongue.1 
The availability of a First Amendment defense to the Lanham Act 
claims turned on whether the supermarket’s communication was classi-
fied as “commercial speech.” The Seventh Circuit held that it was, be-
cause the spread was encouraging consumers to frequent its markets. As 
a result, the court concluded that there was no First Amendment defense 
to the use of Jordan’s identity.2 Is such a conclusion justified either doc-
trinally or normatively? If Jordan had sued Sports Illustrated, the maga-
zine would have had a First Amendment defense because it is not com-
mercial speech. Should Sports Illustrated be exempted from liability 
solely because of this, even though its magazine is unquestionably sold 
for profit? What if the congratulatory advertisements were placed by a 
nonprofit (such as the free health clinic Chicago Community Health) to 
promote its services—should the analysis change? Is there something 
unique about the supermarkets’ speech (other than qualifying doctrinally 
 
1 Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, 743 F.3d 509, 512 & app. (7th Cir. 2014). The image ap-
pears in the court’s Appendix. 
2 Id. at 511–12, 521–22. The parties stipulated that if the spreads were noncommercial 
speech, then the claims were barred by the First Amendment. See id. at 511. 
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as “commercial speech”) that justifies altering the analysis of false en-
dorsement or right of publicity laws among these scenarios? If so, why? 
Next consider throwing your child a birthday party with a Harry Pot-
ter theme. Can you make your own Harry Potter cake with characters 
and images from the movie? If you’re too busy or can’t bake and decide 
to buy one from a bakery, does the bakery have to get a license to depict 
Harry Potter and related images? Should it matter whether the bakery 
advertises or lists Harry Potter cakes as one of its options? What about a 
store that caters to fans of wizardry, from Lord of the Rings to Harry 
Potter, and provides a party space for those who want a wizardry-
themed party? Can the store’s employees dress like Harry Potter charac-
ters and operate a pretend wizardry school without getting permission to 
do so from the movie studio or book publisher? The movie studio Warn-
er Brothers recently filed suit against such a store.3 The cake and the 
wizardry parties raise potential copyright, trademark, and right of pub-
licity claims. Should liability attach in any of these instances? Should we 
differentiate between the scenarios on the basis of whether the uses con-
stitute commercial speech, or are for financial gain, or instead are not 
driven by profit motives? 
Finally, consider a recent advertisement distributed online by the 
children’s toy company Goldie Blox that allegedly infringed the copy-
right to the Beastie Boys’ popular song from the 1980s, “Girls.”4 The 
advertisement shows three girls building amazing contraptions. A musi-
cal parody of the song plays over the ad. The original lyrics called for, 
“Girls—to do the dishes, / Girls—to clean up my room, / Girls—to do 
the laundry”; and to be available to the singer for sex.5 The Goldie Blox 
advertisement retains the tune from the Beastie Boys’ song, but changes 
almost all of the lyrics. The new lyrics include the following: 
You like to buy us pink toys 
And everything else is for boys.  
It’s time to change 
 
3 Complaint, Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc. v. Goldin, No. 13-01540 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2013).  
4 The surviving members of the Beastie Boys sent a cease and desist letter. Goldie Blox 
then filed a declaratory judgment action and the parties ultimately settled. Jon Blistein, 
Beastie Boys Settle Lawsuit over ‘Girls’ Toy Commercial, Rolling Stone (Mar. 18, 2014), 
http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/beastie-boys-settle-lawsuit-over-girls-toy-
commercial-20140318, archived at http://perma.cc/Q4M7-974U.  
5 Beastie Boys, Girls, on Licensed to Ill (Columbia Records 1986). 
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We deserve to see a range 
‘Cause all our toys look just the same 
And we would like to use our brains.  
Girls—To build a spaceship 
Girls—To code a new app 
Girls—To grow up knowing that they can engineer that . . . .6 
The advertisement provides valuable social and political commentary on 
both the song and the world of gendered toys. Should Goldie Blox be 
disfavored in a fair use defense to a copyright infringement claim be-
cause the use is in an advertisement for a product and constitutes com-
mercial speech? What if an identical video were posted by the Guerrilla 
Girls, an activist group whose members make various artworks (and ap-
pear in public in gorilla masks) to expose sexism and racism?7 Should 
these two uses be treated differently? 
If the law distinguishes these various scenarios for purposes of IP law, 
there should be a developed basis for doing so, but thus far there has not 
been one. To date, no convincing basis has been articulated for distin-
guishing commercial and noncommercial speech and uses in IP laws. 
Consideration of these unexplored issues in IP law is particularly timely 
given recent decisions by the Supreme Court that call into question the 
future and scope of the commercial speech doctrine;8 the differential 
treatment of for-profit corporations;9 and the First Amendment limits on 
 
6 Katy Waldman, This Awesome Ad, Set to the Beastie Boys, Is How to Get Girls to Be-
come Engineers, Slate (Nov. 19, 2013), http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2013/11/19/
goldieblox_commercial_rewrites_the_beastie_boys_urges_young_girls_to_pursue.html, ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/KBA2-3NLH (last visited May 12, 2015) (video also on file with 
the Virginia Law Review Association).  
7 See Frequently Asked Questions, Guerilla Girls, http://www.guerrillagirls.com/interview/
faq.shtml, archived at http://perma.cc/NT9L-9Y4M (last visited June 15, 2015).  
8 See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2664, 2667–74 (2011) (suggesting 
that “[c]ommercial speech is no exception” to “heightened scrutiny” of laws and striking 
down law restricting commercial speech even though dissent thought law would survive in-
termediate scrutiny purportedly applied to commercial speech); see also United States v. 
United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 409–10 (2001) (noting controversy over the commercial 
speech doctrine and striking down state assessment to promote mushroom sales); Milavetz, 
Gallop & Milavetz v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 255–56 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(criticizing commercial speech distinction).  
9 See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (allowing closely 
held for-profit corporations to assert religious-liberty protections under the Religious Free-
dom Restoration Act); id. at 2806 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the suggestion in 
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent that for-profit and nonprofit entities should be treated differently). 
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laws that restrict false or misleading statements, even when they are not 
commercial.10 Considering commerciality in IP law is also particularly 
important at this juncture because Congress has announced that it is em-
barking on a major review of copyright law.11 As we consider revising 
copyright laws, the role of commercial speech and commerciality more 
broadly must be part of the discussion. 
Revisions to our trademark laws may also be on the horizon. The de-
gree of confusion and inter- and intracircuit splits on the issue of com-
mercial speech and commercial uses in trademark and false advertising 
laws under the governing Federal Lanham Act is untenable and should 
be part of any legislative reform project. In right of publicity law there 
are continued calls for federal legislation,12 calls that may gain traction 
because of the increasing recognition that state laws cannot be limited to 
state borders, especially with the dominance of the Internet, making the 
most expansive, speech-limiting state laws the ones that govern. If such 
a federal approach to the right of publicity moves forward, it must con-
sider whether, and how, the right should be limited by the commercial 
nature of the persona at issue and whether it should matter if uses of that 
person’s identity are for financial gain or in advertising for commercial 
products or services (that is, in commercial speech). Current law on 
these questions is highly varied between states, and even within the 
same state it is often unresolved. 
One of the challenges for courts, litigants, and scholars alike is that 
the term “commercial” is used to mean multiple things, even within the 
same body of law. In this Article, I not only identify the breadth of the 
confusion surrounding issues of commerciality in IP law, but also devel-
op a taxonomy of what is meant by “commercial” in the context of IP. 
Greater precision of what we mean by “commercial” is required not only 
for clarity’s sake, but also to facilitate the deeper normative analysis that 
 
10 See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2551–56 (2012) (Breyer, J., concur-
ring) (suggesting that laws restricting false or misleading noncommercial speech could be 
constitutional); id. at 2556–65 (Alito, J., dissenting) (contending that law barring false state-
ments was constitutional even if applied to noncommercial speech). 
11 See Jennifer Martinez, House Judiciary Chairman to Launch Sweeping Review of U.S. 
Copyright Law, The Hill (Apr. 24, 2013, 9:13 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/technology/
295979-house-judiciary-chairman-to-launch-sweeping-review-of-copyright, archived at 
http://perma.cc/6BKL-L3Q8.  
12 See, e.g., Richard S. Robinson, Preemption, The Right of Publicity, and a New Federal 
Statute, 16 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 183 (1998); Kevin L. Vick & Jean-Paul Jassy, Why a 
Federal Right of Publicity Statute Is Necessary, 28 Comm. Law. (F. on Comm. L., Am. Bar 
Assoc., Chi., Ill.), Aug. 2011.  
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I engage in as I consider whether commercial speech and commerciality 
more broadly—particularly in the sense of seeking financial gain—are 
worthwhile determinants of liability in the IP context. 
IP claims often overlap and complaints frequently include claims aris-
ing under trademark, right of publicity, and copyright laws. Although 
harmonizing the meanings of “commercial” is not required across these 
areas, to the extent that similar issues or defenses are raised it makes 
sense for the treatment of commerciality to be coordinated. To the extent 
that disparities of treatment are justified by constitutional law and a reli-
ance on the commercial speech doctrine, the meaning of “commercial” 
must track commercial speech jurisprudence and be consistent across 
statutes and bodies of law. Thus far it has not. Moreover, if IP law truly 
relies on commercial speech for its discrimination against commercial 
uses, it cannot ignore the controversies that surround the doctrine nor ig-
nore its arguably narrowing scope. Nor does the First Amendment re-
quire the disfavoring of commercial speech in the context of IP law, 
even if it permits it, making its importation a contested choice, rather 
than a fait accompli. Commercial speech can be valuable and worthy of 
robust speech protection; it can provide useful information and contrib-
ute to our cultural and expressive storehouse. 
Other justifications for disfavoring commercial uses—in the broader 
sense of for-profit uses—also do not stand up to scrutiny. For example, 
commerciality is sometimes used as a proxy for market harm; but this is 
a weak proxy because not-for-profit uses can cause significant harms 
and for-profit uses can cause none. Moreover, evaluations of market 
harm can be directly analyzed and need not rely on such an inaccurate 
proxy. Nor is commerciality a good proxy for the value of the underly-
ing use or its relative fairness or unfairness. For-profit uses can be fair, 
and not-for-profit ones unfair. 
In Part I of the Article, I identify the different aspects of trademark, 
copyright, and right of publicity laws that raise the issue of commerciali-
ty and point out the many areas of confusion on questions as basic as the 
elements of these causes of action and defenses to them. I focus on these 
laws because issues of commerciality and free speech are the most 
prominent, but the analysis here applies more broadly to other areas of 
IP law, such as trade secrets and patent law. 
In Part II, I develop a taxonomy of what is meant by “commercial” in 
IP law. I identify five primary meanings of “commercial”: First, “com-
mercial” is used to indicate a use in commerce that falls within Congres-
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sional powers to regulate under the Commerce Clause. Second, “com-
mercial” is used to identify commercial speech (as that term has been 
defined by the Supreme Court in its First Amendment jurisprudence). 
Commercial speech encompasses advertising for products and services, 
but also includes speech beyond the limited context of advertising. 
Courts often refer to commercial speech as speech that does “no more 
than propose a commercial transaction.”13 Nevertheless, as I will dis-
cuss, the exact contours of commercial speech have not been clearly de-
lineated and the category sweeps more broadly than this definition sug-
gests. A third definition of “commercial” is a broader reference to any 
for-profit use. The determination of what is meant by a “for-profit” use 
is itself contested. At times, “for-profit” is limited to instances in which 
there is an active interest in seeking financial gain (usually through 
sales), while at others it is meant more broadly as seeking any benefit 
(whether monetary or not). Fourth, and sometimes related to a for-profit 
use in a more general sense than mere financial profits, is the use of 
“commercial” to indicate a use that might cause an IP-owner market 
harm. Finally, “commercial” has been used as a pejorative term to indi-
cate uses that are of lesser value—ones that are considered base or of 
limited expressive value. Uses can be commercial in all these ways or 
only in some, and “commercial” is sometimes used to indicate more than 
one of these definitions. 
In Part III, I consider the justifications for using these various mean-
ings of “commercial” as a basis for making determinations of rights, lia-
bility, and defenses to IP claims. The primary justifications for distin-
guishing commercial from noncommercial speech, and commercial from 
noncommercial uses (in the “for-profit” sense), are rooted in concerns 
over free speech and constitutionality, value, harm, and broader princi-
ples of fairness. I consider each of these justifications in turn and ulti-
mately conclude that they fail to provide a convincing normative basis 
for distinctions rooted in commerciality and that none adequately ex-
plains the current contours of IP laws. 
Finally, in Part IV, I provide some preliminary observations about the 
implications of this analysis and the importance of creating a more co-
 
13 Harris v. Quinn, 132 S. Ct. 2618, 2639 (2014); see also Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan 
Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002, 1017 (9th Cir. 2004) (using this definition in the context of 
the Lanham Act); Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 
970 (10th Cir. 1996) (same in the context of the right of publicity). 
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herent IP law that better identifies when commerciality should and 
should not matter. 
I. THE ROLE OF COMMERCIALITY IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 
Questions of commerciality pervade IP law. In some instances com-
merciality is required to obtain rights, and in others it determines liabil-
ity for uses of another’s IP. Some defenses also turn on commerciality, 
often favoring noncommercial uses and disfavoring commercial ones. In 
this Part, I provide an overview of the vast number of issues in IP law 
that require consideration of commerciality and the massive state of con-
fusion that surrounds them. I will discuss trademark and related laws, 
copyright law, and right of publicity laws. I defer until the next Part a 
more robust and nuanced development of the different meanings of 
“commercial” in IP. 
A. Trademark Law and Related Lanham Act Causes of Action 
Nowhere is the confusion over commercial speech and commercial 
use in IP more apparent than in the context of trademark law and, more 
broadly, in the Lanham Act in which federal trademark law is located. 
Courts do not agree on whether the governing Lanham Act is limited to 
commercial speech, commercial uses, or to neither, nor do they agree 
even as to what each of these terms means. The Lanham Act provides 
causes of action for trademark infringement, dilution, false endorsement, 
false designation of origin, false advertising, and cybersquatting.14 Some 
courts have concluded that the Lanham Act applies only to commercial 
speech.15 Others have concluded that the Act is limited to commercial 
uses, but not necessarily to the contours of commercial speech.16 Still 
other courts have concluded that the Lanham Act sweeps more broadly, 
 
14 State laws also provide similar causes of action, but I limit this discussion to federal law. 
15 See, e.g., Farah v. Esquire Magazine, 736 F.3d 528, 541 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Taubman Co. 
v. Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770, 774 (6th Cir. 2003); see also Nissan Motor Co., 378 F.3d at 1007 
(suggesting that First Amendment problems would arise if critical noncommercial speech 
were enjoined by federal dilution law). 
16 See, e.g., Bosley Med. Inst. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 676 (9th Cir. 2005); Int’l Ass’n of 
Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Winship Green Nursing Ctr., 103 F.3d 196, 209–10 (1st 
Cir. 1996) (Saris, J., concurring); Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 2d 309, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000). 
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encompassing both commercial and noncommercial speech and com-
mercial and noncommercial uses.17 
The lack of uniformity, while widespread, is rarely acknowledged. A 
district court in Colorado, for example, proclaimed that it is “accepted 
doctrine that the Lanham Act may restrict non-commercial speech.”18 In 
contrast, the D.C. Circuit recently declared the exact opposite: “Every 
circuit court of appeals to address the scope of [Section 43 of the Lan-
ham Act] has held that [its provisions] apply only to commercial 
speech.”19 The Seventh Circuit recently conceded its own uncertainty on 
the point: “[I]t’s not clear that the Supreme Court’s commercial-speech 
doctrine should be used to define” the scope of the Lanham Act.20 The 
court nevertheless so interpreted the law because the parties had conced-
ed the point and the judges seemed eager to avoid wading into these 
treacherous waters.21 
Even within the same federal circuits, there are intracircuit splits on 
the issue. Perhaps the most telling example of such disarray is the in-
tracircuit conflict in the Sixth Circuit. In that circuit, in the very same 
year (2003), several panels came to conflicting conclusions about the 
scope of the Lanham Act. One panel decided that the Lanham Act was 
limited to commercial speech, while two others concluded to the contra-
ry that it also covered noncommercial speech.22 The conflict between 
these decisions remains unresolved in the Sixth Circuit. 
The staggering amount of disagreement demonstrates that there is no 
widely accepted answer to the most basic questions about the scope and 
 
17 See, e.g., Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, 214 F.3d 658, 664–65, 672–75 (5th 
Cir. 2000); Browne v. McCain, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1078–79 (C.D. Cal. 2009); Ocean 
Bio-Chem, Inc. v. Turner Network Television, 741 F. Supp. 1546, 1552 (S.D. Fla. 1990); see 
also Lisa P. Ramsey, Increasing First Amendment Scrutiny of Trademark Law, 61 SMU L. 
Rev. 381, 403–04 (2008) (observing the confusion over the jurisdictional role of commercial 
uses and commercial speech in trademark laws). 
18 U.S. Olympic Comm. v. Am. Media, Inc., 156 F. Supp. 2d 1200, 1209–10 (D. Colo. 
2001) (citing Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989)) (rejecting a claim under 
the Amateur Sports Act, but noting that both it and the Lanham Act apply to noncommercial 
speech). 
19 Farah, 736 F.3d at 541. 
20 Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, 743 F.3d 509, 514 n.4 (7th Cir. 2014). 
21 Id.  
22 Compare Taubman Co. v. Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770, 774 (6th Cir. 2003) (concluding that 
“[t]he Lanham Act is constitutional because it only regulates commercial speech”), with 
ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 920–27 (6th Cir. 2003) (applying Lanham 
Act to noncommercial speech), and Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 445–59 (6th Cir. 
2003) (same).  
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sweep of the Lanham Act. The differing views are not merely academic 
in nature; they affect the outcome in numerous cases. Despite the uncer-
tainty about the role of commerciality in the Lanham Act, there is 
agreement about the areas in which commerciality may be relevant: The 
commercial status of a use has been relevant for the acquisition of 
trademark rights, for proving various Lanham Act claims, and for de-
fenses to those claims. I will briefly discuss these aspects of the Lanham 
Act. 
1. Trademark Registration and Rights 
Despite some claims that the Lanham Act is limited to commercial 
speech or commercial activities, there is a consensus that it is not so cir-
cumscribed in the context of acquiring trademark protection and regis-
tering marks. Before one can claim federal trademark rights or register a 
mark with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”), the mark 
must be “used in commerce.”23 This requirement stems from both the 
necessity of falling within the ambit of the Commerce Clause—under 
which the Lanham Act is authorized—and the definitions of “use in 
commerce” and trade and service marks that are provided in Section 45 
of the Act.24 Although there must be a use in commerce, there is no “for-
profit” requirement to acquire a trademark. Neither goods nor services 
need be sold, and nonprofit entities qualify for protection and registra-
tion.25 
2. Trademark Infringement 
Many of the courts that have made sweeping pronouncements about 
whether the Lanham Act applies only to commercial speech have done 
so in the context of deciding the scope of trademark infringement ac-
tions under Sections 32 and 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act. Sections 32 
 
23 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1052(d), (f), 1058(b), 1127 (2012). I use the term “trademark” 
in its broad sense to encompass service marks, collective marks, and certification marks. 
Marks can be protected without regard to whether they are registered. 
24 § 1127 (Lanham Act § 45).  
25 Numerous marks have been registered for nonprofit entities. See, e.g., Radiance Found., 
Inc. v. NAACP, 25 F. Supp. 3d 865, 865, 890 (E.D. Va. 2014) (discussing registered mark 
for the NAACP), vacated on other grounds, 786 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2015). Collective and cer-
tification marks are also often registered to nonprofits, for example, Alzheimer’s Associa-
tion, Registration No. 2850223; Dykes on Bikes, Registration No. 3323803. See U.S. Patent 
& Trademark Office, Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure § 1304.01 (Jan. 2015). 
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and 43, in addition to requiring a use in commerce by defendants of a 
confusingly similar mark, limit infringement actions to circumstances in 
which a defendant’s use is “in connection with” the sale, distribution, or 
advertising of “any goods or services.”26 Section 43 adds to the list that 
the use can also be in connection with “commercial activities.”27 The 
statute does not define “commercial activities.” The term is likely meant 
broadly to encompass endeavors beyond the sale or advertising of goods 
or services. 
On the basis of the “in connection” language, some courts have sug-
gested that both Sections 32 and 43 should be limited to commercial us-
es, with “commercial” meaning for profit (or at least for sale, even if not 
for financial profit).28 The lack of the term “commercial” before “goods 
or services” suggests that the statute does not limit goods and services 
only to “commercial” ones. Nevertheless, there is plenty of room for dif-
fering statutory interpretations. 
Some courts have concluded that infringement actions are limited nar-
rowly only to commercial speech.29 Yet many other courts have con-
cluded that the “in connection” language encompasses both noncom-
mercial speech and not-for-profit activities, including uses by charitable 
organizations, political candidates, and political groups.30 For example, 
the Lanham Act has been used to enjoin magazine and movie titles, po-
litical materials, books, t-shirts with political slogans, websites for non-
profits, and fake parody ads placed in humor magazines.31 Courts have 
allowed trademark infringement claims to proceed in the context of po-
litical advertisements, videogames, songs, television shows, and mov-
 
26 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125 (2012).  
27 § 1125.  
28 See, e.g., Bosley Med. Inst. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 676 (9th Cir. 2005); Int’l Ass’n of 
Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Winship Green Nursing Ctr., 914 F. Supp. 651, 653–54 
& n.2 (D. Me. 1996).  
29 See, e.g., Farah v. Esquire Magazine, 736 F.3d 528, 541 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Taubman Co. 
v. Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770, 774 (6th Cir. 2003).  
30 See supra note 17. 
31 See, e.g., Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997) (af-
firming preliminary injunction against book); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 
F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994) (allowing injunction against magazine); Hershey Co. v. Friends of 
Steve Hershey, 33 F. Supp. 3d 588 (D. Md. 2014) (enjoining use of Hershey’s trade dress in 
political campaign); Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282 (D.N.J. 1998) (enjoining 
critical website); Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727 (D. 
Minn. 1998) (enjoining movie title).  
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ies.32 Even when such claims are ultimately rejected, many courts have 
not questioned the jurisdictional reach of the Lanham Act to cover such 
noncommercial speech.33 
When it comes to determining liability, some courts tolerate different 
levels of likely confusion—the standard for determining liability for in-
fringement—depending on whether the speech at issue is commercial. 
Several courts permit no likely confusion in the context of commercial 
speech, but conclude that some confusing speech must be allowed in the 
context of noncommercial speech.34 
The applicability and success of affirmative defenses to trademark in-
fringement sometimes also turn on whether the allegedly infringing act 
is classified as commercial speech. To the extent that courts apply First 
Amendment and other speech-protective defenses, many conclude that 
their scope and applicability vary on the basis of commerciality.35 Some 
courts have suggested that there is no First Amendment defense for 
commercial speech that is found likely to confuse consumers.36 Other 
courts, however, have rejected First Amendment defenses even in the 
 
32 See, e.g., Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003) (allowing claim arising 
out of song title); Dillinger, L.L.C. v. Elec. Arts, 795 F. Supp. 2d 829 (S.D. Ind. 2011) (al-
lowing claim for use in videogame); Browne v. McCain, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1073 (C.D. Cal. 
2009) (permitting claim arising out of presidential campaign ad); O’Grady v. Twentieth Cen-
tury Fox Film Corp., No. 5-02CV173, 2003 WL 24174616 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2003) (al-
lowing claim in context of movie and related advertising); Films of Distinction v. Allegro 
Film Prods., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (allowing claim arising out of use of tele-
vision network name in television movie).  
33 See, e.g., Fortres Grand Corp. v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., 763 F.3d 696 (7th Cir. 
2014) (considering claim for use of trademark in film and on promotional websites); Brown 
v. Elec. Arts, 724 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 2013) (same in context of videogame); ETW Corp. v. 
Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 924 (6th Cir. 2003) (same in context of artwork); Mattel, 
Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002) (same in context of song); Am. 
Family Life Ins. Co. v. Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2d 682 (N.D. Ohio 2002) (same in context of 
political advertisement).  
34 See, e.g., Girl Scouts of the U.S.A. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Grp., 808 F. Supp. 
1112, 1122 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (applying likelihood-of-confusion test with First Amendment in 
mind in context of noncommercial speech). 
35 See Brown, 724 F.3d at 1241–47 (applying First Amendment-infused Rogers test to ex-
pressive speech); ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 927–28, 936–37 (same); Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 
F.2d 994, 997–1002 (2d Cir. 1989) (providing more robust defense to works deemed expres-
sive or artistic). 
36 See, e.g., Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1017–18 (3d Cir. 2008); Kelley 
Blue Book v. Car-Smarts, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 278, 291 (C.D. Cal. 1992).  
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context of noncommercial speech.37 While some speech-protective de-
fenses, such as descriptive and nominative fair use, apply regardless of 
commerciality,38 others are limited to noncommercial speech. Most no-
tably, the Rogers test,39 which provides a defense when a use is artisti-
cally relevant and not explicitly misleading,40 has been applied only to 
noncommercial speech.41 
3. Trademark Dilution 
Similar confusion occurs in dilution law. Dilution law protects 
markholders and, allegedly (though somewhat unconvincingly), con-
sumers against the watering down (blurring) or tarnishing of a mark, 
without regard to likely confusion.42 The statute provides a number of 
exclusions from liability for dilution. One exemption is for “[a]ny fair 
use . . . other than as a designation of source,” including use in compara-
tive advertisements and “use in connection with . . . identifying and par-
odying, criticizing, or commenting upon the famous mark owner or the 
goods or services of the famous mark owner.”43 Other exclusions in-
clude “[a]ll forms of news reporting and news commentary,” and, of 
particular relevance for this discussion, an exclusion for “[a]ny non-
commercial use of a mark.”44 
 
37 See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769, 775–77 (8th Cir. 1994); 
Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1078–79; Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods., Inc., 35 
F. Supp. 2d 727, 732–35 (D. Minn. 1998). 
38 See, e.g., New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 
1992) (developing the nominative fair use test and applying it to an advertisement for a fee-
based hotline); U.S. Shoe Corp. v. Brown Grp., 740 F. Supp. 196, 198–99 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) 
(applying the descriptive fair use defense, 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4), to an advertisement for 
shoes).  
39 Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999. 
40 See, e.g., Brown, 724 F.3d at 1241–48 (applying Rogers test); Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Trs. 
v. New Life Art, Inc., 683 F.3d 1266, 1277–79 (11th Cir. 2012) (same); ETW Corp., 332 
F.3d at 920–21, 926–28 (same). 
41 See Facenda, 542 F.3d at 1015–18; cf. Fortres Grand Corp. v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, 
Inc., 947 F. Supp. 2d 922, 931–34 (N.D. Ind. 2013) (accepting the proposition that the Rog-
ers test is limited to noncommercial speech, but concluding that promotional websites for a 
movie were not commercial speech and were protected under Rogers). 
42 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2012); see Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trade-
mark Law & Cognitive Science, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 507 (2008) (questioning the scientific basis 
for dilution law).  
43 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A)(ii).  
44 § 1125(c)(3)(B), (C) (emphasis added). 
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The statute does not define “noncommercial use.” The House Report 
accompanying the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 (“FTDA”) 
suggests it was meant as “[not] ‘commercial’ speech.”45 The report 
states that the “bill expressly incorporates the concept of ‘commercial’ 
speech from the ‘commercial speech’ doctrine, and proscribes dilution ac-
tions that seek to enjoin use of famous marks in ‘non-commercial’ uses 
(such as consumer product reviews).”46 The report also suggests that 
Congress particularly wanted to protect the news and entertainment in-
dustries from possible liability for dilution.47 Given the for-profit status 
of the news, movie, and television businesses, the use of the term “non-
commercial” can make sense in this context only if it was intended to 
indicate uses that were not commercial speech. 
This interpretation of the noncommercial use exception has been fol-
lowed by many courts.48 A few courts, however, have allowed dilution 
claims against noncommercial speech.49 One explanation for these deci-
sions is a different statutory interpretation—that the noncommercial use 
exemption applies only to uses that are not “in connection” with the sale, 
distribution, or advertising of goods or services or other commercial ac-
tivities.50 Reading the statute without resort to the legislative history po-
 
45 H.R. Rep. No. 104-374, at 8 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1035.  
46 Id.  
47 See id.; 141 Cong. Rec. H14,317-01 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 1995) (statement of Rep. Moor-
head). 
48 See, e.g., Radiance Found., Inc. v. NAACP, 786 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2015); Mattel, Inc. v. 
MCA Records, 296 F.3d 894, 904–07 (9th Cir. 2002); Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 537 
F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1339–40 (N.D. Ga. 2008); Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282, 
307 (D.N.J. 1998); see also Lee Ann W. Lockridge, When Is a Use in Commerce a Non-
commercial Use, 37 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 337, 338 (2010) (interpreting the provision to indicate 
noncommercial speech).  
49 See, e.g., Hershey Co. v. Friends of Steve Hershey, No. 14-1825, 2015 WL 795841, at 
*5–6 (D. Md. Feb. 24, 2015) (citing Am. Family Life Ins. v. Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2d 682 
(N.D. Ohio 2002)) (suggesting somewhat confoundingly that noncommercial use exemption 
refers only to speech protected by the First Amendment, which did not include using Her-
shey’s trade dress in a political advertisement); Kraft Foods Holdings v. Helm, 205 
F. Supp. 2d 942, 952–55 (N.D. Ill. 2002); Films of Distinction v. Allegro Film Prods., 12 
F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1078–79 (C.D. Cal. 1998); cf. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 
28 F.3d 769, 777–78 (8th Cir. 1994) (allowing dilution claim under Missouri law in the con-
text of noncommercial use). 
50 See, e.g., Radiance Found., Inc. v. NAACP, 25 F. Supp. 3d 865, 898–99 (E.D. Va. 
2014) (concluding that noncommercial use exemption did not apply because the use was “in 
connection with the offering for sale of services” despite the “absence of an economic moti-
vation for the speech”), vacated, 786 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2015) (holding, without considering 
the statutory changes in the Trademark Dilution Revision Act, that the dilution provision’s 
noncommercial use exemption still means not “commercial speech”). 
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tentially supports a broader interpretation of “noncommercial use.” If the 
exclusion limited dilution only to commercial speech, why would there 
need to be a separate exemption for news reporting and news commen-
tary? One explanation could be that Congress was taking a belt-and-
suspenders approach to free speech concerns.  
Despite the likelihood that Congress exercised an abundance of cau-
tion by adding overlapping exemptions, the alternative reading of the 
noncommercial use exemption (as meaning a use that is not for profit) is 
supported at least in part by the 2006 revisions to the dilution provision. 
The 2006 Trademark Dilution Revision Act (“TDRA”) struck out a pre-
vious statutory requirement that the use be a “commercial use.”51 This 
removal suggests a possible intention to broaden the dilution provision 
to encompass noncommercial speech.52 If it is now appropriate to read 
the noncommercial use exemption as limited to not-for-profit uses, then 
a variety of for-profit enterprises long thought safe from dilution laws 
may now be subject to liability, such as the movie and music businesses. 
I do not endorse this interpretation, but it is plausible given the plain 
language of the statute and the changes both enacted by and considered 
in the process of adopting the 2006 revisions. Only one court to date has 
directly considered the removal of the commercial use requirement in 
the 2006 amendment. This court concluded that noncommercial speech 
may now fall within the dilution provision’s purview; however, this de-
cision was recently reversed by the Fourth Circuit.53 
4. False Advertising Under the Lanham Act 
Strictly speaking, false advertising law is not a part of trademark law 
or IP law. Nevertheless, it is useful to consider the Lanham Act’s false 
advertising provision because it appears in the identical subsection of the 
Lanham Act as the provision for infringement (of unregistered marks), 
and the two claims often are co-pled and rely on common precedents.54 
The meaning of “commercial” used in Section 43(a)(1)(A) (the in-
fringement provision) and Section 43(a)(1)(B) (the false advertising 
 
51 Compare Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 3, 109 Stat. 
985, 985 (1996), with Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, § 2, 
120 Stat. 1730, 1730–32 (2006). 
52 152 Cong. Rec. H6963 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 2006) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner). 
53 Radiance Found., 25 F. Supp. 3d at 898–99, vacated, 786 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2015). 
54 See Rebecca Tushnet, Running the Gamut from A to B: Federal Trademark and False 
Advertising Law, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1305, 1308 (2011). 
COPYRIGHT © 2015, VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION  
2015] The Intellectual Property Quagmire 1945 
provision) should be the same unless the meaning is clearly differentiat-
ed—which it is not.55 
The false advertising provision has often been limited to commercial 
speech.56 This conclusion has been less contested than in the infringe-
ment or false endorsement context. Nevertheless, some courts have sug-
gested that the false advertising provisions also apply to noncommercial 
speech.57 
5. Anti-Cybersquatting Protection Act 
Perhaps to avoid being mired in the commercial speech chaos, Con-
gress chose to avoid making commerciality the focal point of liability in 
the Anti-Cybersquatting Protection Act (“ACPA”), added to the Lanham 
Act in 1999.58 Instead, the provision establishes liability for using a do-
main name with a “bad faith intent to profit” from the use of the plain-
tiff’s trademark or name.59 This provision sets forth a clearer standard 
than commerciality—by using an “intent to profit” standard as the lode-
star for violations of the provision. The legislative history emphasizes 
that noncommercial uses can run afoul of the provision and should not 
be exempted from its purview.60 The intent-to-profit standard itself has 
encompassed a variety of potential profits beyond mere financial gain—
for example, seeking editorial space in a newspaper or bringing attention 
and traffic to a cybersquatter’s views on abortion.61 The Eighth Circuit 
 
55 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (2012); cf. Tushnet, supra note 54 (advocating greater har-
mony between false advertising and infringement provisions).  
56 See, e.g., Fashion Boutique of Short Hills v. Fendi USA, 314 F.3d 48, 56–57 (2d Cir. 
2002); Seven-Up Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 86 F.3d 1379, 1382–85 & n.6 (5th Cir. 1996); Ox-
ycal Labs., Inc v. Jeffers, 909 F. Supp. 719, 722 (S.D. Cal. 1995).  
57 See, e.g., ONY, Inc. v. Cornerstone Therapeutics, Inc., 720 F.3d 490, 496–98 (2d Cir. 
2013) (considering false advertising claim arising from a scientific journal article, but ulti-
mately rejecting the claim because the article’s conclusions were matters of opinion); ALPO 
Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 913 F.2d 958, 973 n.16 (D.C. Cir. 1990).  
58 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2012) (Lanham Act § 43(d)).  
59 Id.  
60 S. Rep. No. 106-140, at 8–9 (1999); see also Bosley Med. Inst. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 
680–81 (9th Cir. 2005) (distinguishing the ACPA—which permits actions for noncommer-
cial uses—from the infringement and dilution provisions which, according to the panel, do 
not). 
61 See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Purdy, 382 F.3d 774, 786 (8th Cir. 2004) (“Profit includes 
an attempt to procure an ‘advantageous gain or return.’” (quoting The American Heritage 
College Dictionary 1092 (3d ed. 1993))). Notably, in Purdy, the Eighth Circuit suggested 
that the defendant’s websites were not “completely noncommercial since they directly solic-
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has concluded that the First Amendment is no obstacle to applying the 
ACPA to noncommercial uses.62 The statute expressly permits consider-
ation of whether a use is “noncommercial” as one of several factors to 
consider in evaluating bad faith, but it is not a jurisdictional hurdle.63 
Nevertheless, like other areas of the Lanham Act, courts have struggled 
to define exactly what is meant by a “noncommercial use” under the 
ACPA.64 
B. Copyright 
Copyright law originally did not make distinctions based on commer-
ciality, but over the years considerations of commerciality have grown. 
This Section sets forth the current role of commerciality in copyright 
law, particularly in the contexts of acquiring a copyright (which is cur-
rently neutral as to commerciality) and the various defenses and exemp-
tions to infringement. In contrast to trademark law, there is greater uni-
formity and agreement about the role of commerciality in copyright law. 
1. Neutrality in the Acquisition and Scope of Copyright Protection 
Copyright vests in a particular work without regard to its commercial-
ity, sales, or distribution. Whether a work is commercially exploited 
does not affect determinations of whether a work is copyrightable or the 
scope of copyright protection. A person who writes a novel without 
any interest in selling it and throws her draft in a desk drawer still has a 
copyright in the work. A person who writes a political polemic with no 
interest in making money from it and who gives copies away for free al-
so receives a copyright in his work. Although copyright status does not 
differ depending on commerciality, Congress recently added a provision 
that allows for the preregistration of “works being prepared for commer-
 
ited monetary contributions and offered various antiabortion merchandise for sale,” or linked 
to third-party sites that solicited funds and sold merchandise. Id. at 785–86.  
62 Id. at 787–88. 
63 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B). 
64 See, e.g., ISystems v. Spark Networks, No. 10-10905, 2012 WL 3101672, at *2 (5th Cir. 
Mar. 21, 2012) (per curiam) (concluding that “noncommercial” in ACPA indicates a not-for-
profit use); Bosley Med. Inst. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 676–81 (9th Cir. 2005) (concluding 
that links to third-party sites that sell goods did not rise to the level of a commercial use un-
der ACPA factor); Purdy, 382 F.3d at 785–87 (concluding that uses on anti-abortion web-
sites were commercial because donations were solicited and anti-abortion merchandise was 
available for purchase, and also considering it commercial when there were links to third-
party sites that solicited donations).  
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cial distribution” when there has been a history of infringement of this 
type of work in the past.65 
2. Fair Use and the Disfavoring of Commercial Uses 
Copyright’s neutrality as to commercial status in the context of the 
accrual of copyright stands in contrast to the overall disfavoring of 
commercial uses in other areas of copyright law. Fair use provides one 
of the primary exceptions to copyright infringement. The fair use doc-
trine has been codified in Section 107 of the Copyright Act. The pream-
ble to the section expressly provides a number of privileged categories 
of uses, many of which have been understood as “noncommercial” in 
nature. These include “criticism, comment, news reporting, teach-
ing . . . scholarship, or research.”66 Section 107 also provides four non-
exclusive factors that courts consider when evaluating whether a particu-
lar use of another’s copyrighted work is fair and therefore 
noninfringing.67 Two of these fair use factors disfavor commercial uses 
and give preference to nonprofit ones. The first fair use factor explicitly 
considers commerciality, instructing courts to consider “the purpose and 
character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial na-
ture or is for nonprofit educational purposes.”68 Courts have routinely 
concluded that a finding that a use is “commercial” weighs against fair 
use,69 and on the flipside that nonprofit or noncommercial uses weigh in 
 
65 17 U.S.C. § 408(f) (2012). The provision was added in 2005 as part of the Family Enter-
tainment and Copyright Act of 2005, and the Artists’ Rights and Theft Prevention Act of 
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-9, 119 Stat. 218 (2005). The law was passed to address prerelease pi-
racy of motion pictures. See H.R. Rep. No. 109-33, at 2–4 (2005); Preregistration Infor-
mation, U.S. Copyright Off., http://www.copyright.gov/prereg/help.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/B5KZ-DVSV (last updated Apr. 30, 2014).  
66 17 U.S.C  § 107 (2012).  
67 The statute provides:  
In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the 
factors to be considered shall include—(1) the purpose and character of the use, in-
cluding whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational 
purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of 
the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of 
the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. 
Id.  
68 Id. (emphasis added).  
69 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591–93 (1994); Sony Corp. of 
Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449 (1984); Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google, 
Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Monge v. Maya Magazines, 688 F.3d 1164, 
1176–77 (9th Cir. 2012).  
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favor of fair use.70 Although the fair use provision does not single out 
commercial speech or advertising, some courts have indicated that uses 
in advertising are particularly disfavored for fair use purposes.71 When 
courts consider the fourth fair use factor—“the effect of the use upon the 
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work”—they often pre-
sume a market harm if a defendant’s use is commercial.72 
Although scholars to date have not robustly debated the role of com-
merciality in copyright law, some have noted the troublesome addition 
of considerations of what is commercial to the fair use analysis. Barton 
Beebe, for example, has suggested that the addition of the term “com-
mercial” to the fair use provisions has led to “no end of trouble.”73 Mat-
thew Sag has observed that the meaning of “commercial use” in fair use 
cases “confounds common sense understandings of what is, and is not, 
commercial.”74 Without a universally agreed-upon understanding of 
what is meant by “commercial”—one that is accepted by the courts—it 
will continue to be a challenge to assess the role of commerciality when 
evaluating fair use. 
 
70 See, e.g., Diversey v. Schmidly, 738 F.3d 1196, 1203 (10th Cir. 2013) (noting that “non-
commercial, educational” use “weighs strongly” in favor of fair use, but nevertheless con-
cluding that fair use had not been established in the case); see also Barton Beebe, An Empir-
ical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 549, 561, 
595–603 (2008) (noting a strong correlation between finding that a use is fair and finding 
that it is not a commercial use).  
71 See, e.g., Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 175 (2nd Cir. 2001) (concluding that where 
a use in an advertisement is not transformative, its status as an advertisement weighs heavily 
against fair use because advertisements are “at the outer limit of commercialism”); Leibovitz 
v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 115 (2d Cir. 1998) (suggesting that because par-
ody appeared in an advertisement there was more limited “indulgence” for the use, but nev-
ertheless holding that the use was fair); see also Campbell, 510 U.S. at 585 (“The use, for 
example, of a copyrighted work to advertise a product . . . will be entitled to less indulgence 
under the first factor . . . .”); 4 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright 
§ 13.05[A][1][c] (2015) (noting that uses of works in advertising are “least likely to justify a 
fair use defense,” but suggesting that advertising for creative works may be treated better 
than advertising for nonexpressive products or services). Use in advertising, however, is not 
dispositive and numerous decisions have held uses in advertising fair. See, e.g., Leibovitz, 
137 F.3d at 114–17 (affirming finding of fair use in context of advertisement).  
72 See, e.g., Balsley v. LFP, Inc., 691 F.3d 747, 760–61 (6th Cir. 2012); Murphy v. Millenni-
um Radio Grp., 650 F.3d 295, 307–09 (3d Cir. 2011); Monge, 688 F.3d at 1172, 1180–81. 
73 Beebe, supra note 70, at 561. 
74 Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 Ohio St. L.J. 47, 60 (2012). 
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3. Other Specific Provisions Favoring Noncommercial Uses 
In addition to the fair use defense, a number of other sections of the 
Copyright Act consider whether works are commercial. These include a 
variety of exemptions and limitations that favor nonprofit educational 
institutions, public broadcasters, libraries and archives, and others when 
the uses are not for a “commercial advantage” or when they are con-
ducted by noncommercial entities.75 Recent federal regulations that pro-
vide exceptions to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s anti-
circumvention provisions (that bar evasion of technological protection 
measures) also favor uses deemed noncommercial.76 For example, the 
current regulations allow exemptions for accessing “motion picture ex-
cerpts” for use in documentary films, teaching (particularly in film stud-
ies), and also in “noncommercial videos.”77 
4. Remedies and Criminal Provisions 
The availability and amount of statutory damages and the applicabil-
ity of criminal penalties in the copyright context also turn in part on 
commerciality. The statutory damages provision allows for remittance if 
an infringer works for a “nonprofit educational institution, library, or ar-
chives,” was acting in the “scope of his or her employment,” and 
thought (and had reasonable grounds for thinking) that the use was 
fair.78 To be liable for criminal copyright infringement the infringement 
must have been committed “for purposes of commercial advantage or 
private financial gain” or “by the distribution of a work being prepared 
for commercial distribution, by making it available on a computer net-
work accessible to members of the public.”79  
*** 
In sum, copyright law generally does not prefer commercial or non-
commercial works for purposes of affording affirmative rights. When 
considering defenses and exemptions from liability, however, copyright 
disfavors commercial uses, and favors noncommercial ones. 
 
75 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 108, 109(b), 110–12, 114, 118 (2012).  
76 See, e.g., § 1201.  
77 37 C.F.R. § 201.40(b)(4) (2014) (emphasis added). 
78 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2012).  
79 § 506(a) (emphasis added).  
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C. The Right of Publicity 
The right of publicity is more similar to trademark law than to copy-
right law in both its treatment of and the surrounding confusion about 
the role of commerciality. The right of publicity is a state law cause of 
action (either at common law or by statute) that provides damages and 
injunctive relief if a person or entity uses another person’s name, like-
ness, voice, or other indicia of identity without permission, often for a 
commercial purpose (though sometimes for any purpose or advantage).80 
Although commerciality is often relevant to determine whether a person 
can bring a right of publicity claim, state laws and courts (even those 
applying the very same law) do not agree on whether or what type of 
commerciality is required to establish a right of publicity claim. 
Many scholars and jurists have expressed concerns about the dangers 
posed to free speech by the right of publicity.81 One of the frequent re-
sponses to these concerns is that the right of publicity is limited in 
scope—to commercial speech—and therefore poses little (or at least 
limited) risk.82 The leading treatise author on the right of publicity, J. 
Thomas McCarthy, has contended that “the only kind of speech impact-
ed by the right of publicity is commercial speech—advertising. Not 
news, not stories, not entertainment and not entertainment satire and 
 
80 There are many variations among state laws, so even this general statement of the cause 
of action is not accurate in all states. For example, some states limit liability to instances in 
which a name or likeness is used. See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-25-1103 (West 2015) 
(limiting liability to use of “name, photograph, or likeness”). 
81 See, e.g., Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 197 F.3d 1284, 1288 (9th Cir. 1999) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 971 F.3d 
1395, 1407–08 (9th Cir. 1992) (Alarcon, J., dissenting); Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable 
Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 841 (6th Cir. 1983) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Eugene Volokh, 
Freedom of Speech and the Right of Publicity, 40 Hous. L. Rev. 903 passim (2003); Diane 
Leenheer Zimmerman, Fitting Publicity Rights into Intellectual Property and Free Speech 
Theory: Sam, You Made the Pants Too Long, 10 DePaul-LCA J. Art & Ent. L. 283 passim 
(2000).  
82 See, e.g., Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Toward a Limited Right of Publicity: An Argu-
ment for the Convergence of the Right of Publicity, Unfair Competition and Trademark 
Law, 23 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 132, 177 (2012); J. Thomas McCarthy & 
Paul M. Anderson, Protection of the Athlete’s Identity: The Right of Publicity, Endorse-
ments and Domain Names, 11 Marq. Sports L. Rev. 195, 198 (2001); J.T. McCarthy, The 
Spring 1995 Horace S. Manges Lecture - The Human Persona As Commercial Property: The 
Right of Publicity, 19 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 129, 131 (1995) [hereinafter McCarthy, 
Human Persona]; George P. Smith, II, The Extent of Protection of the Individual’s Personali-
ty Against Commercial Use: Toward a New Property Right, 54 S.C. L. Rev. 1, 42 (2002).  
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parody—only advertising and similar commercial uses.”83 The facts on 
the ground, however, challenge this vision of a limited right. Although 
some states limit the right of publicity to commercial speech, most do 
not. In this Section, I discuss the role of commerciality in right of pub-
licity law where it is considered in three contexts—the acquisition of en-
forceable rights of publicity, the determination of infringement of those 
rights, and defenses to such claims. 
1. Acquisition of a Right of Publicity 
Although the right of publicity is better thought of as a legal claim ra-
ther than as an independently acquired property right, I analyze the re-
quirements for having an enforceable publicity right here using the 
frame of acquisition. This rubric accurately captures most current doc-
trine, however problematic it may be, and also facilitates the comparison 
with trademark and copyright laws. Some states include as one of the el-
ements of a right of publicity action that an identity-holder must have a 
commercially valuable persona.84 Some states go a step further and also 
require active commercial exploitation of a commercially valuable iden-
tity. Pennsylvania, for example, requires the development of “commer-
cial value” through the “investment of time, effort and money.”85 Some 
jurisdictions require not only efforts to commercially exploit one’s iden-
tity, but actual success and obtainment of a celebrity-like status.86 
Some states set the bar much lower. They conclude that even if a per-
son has no independent commercial value in her identity, her persona 
can be considered valuable if it is used in a commercial context.87 One 
 
83 McCarthy, Human Persona, supra note 82, at 131. 
84 See, e.g., Ind. Code Ann. § 32-36-1-6 (LexisNexis 2014); Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 
F.3d 437, 460 (6th Cir. 2003). I use the term “identity-holder,” rather than “publicity-holder” 
because if the right of publicity is a transferable property right as is often claimed, the two 
may not be the same. The “identity-holder” is the person upon whom the publicity rights are 
based (the individual with whom publicity rights first vest and whose identity is the one that 
must be used to show a violation of the right). The “publicity-holder” is the person who 
owns the right of publicity. For a more detailed discussion of this distinction see Jennifer E. 
Rothman, The Inalienable Right of Publicity, 101 Geo. L.J. 185, 186–87 (2012). 
85 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8316(a), (e) (West 2014).  
86 See, e.g., McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 918–23 (3d Cir. 1994) (applying New Jer-
sey law); Cheatham v. Paisano Publ’ns, Inc., 891 F. Supp. 381, 386–87 (W.D. Ky. 1995) 
(applying Kentucky law). 
87 See, e.g., Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 785, 799–800, 807–09 (N.D. Cal. 
2011); see also 1 J.T. McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity & Privacy §§ 3:24, 4:4 (2014) (ad-
vocating for this standard of evaluation of commercial value).  
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recent example of this approach appears in the litigation against Face-
book for the use of its subscribers’ names and images without their per-
mission in sponsored advertisements. A district court in California con-
cluded that the subscribers’ identities were commercially valuable 
because Facebook’s use demonstrated such value, even if the specific 
identities did not independently have commercial value.88 Notably, an-
other court in the very same district, applying the very same California 
law, disagreed, contending that there was no demonstrated independent 
commercial value to the plaintiffs’ identities, and therefore no right of 
publicity claim could proceed.89 
Many other jurisdictions allow a person to assert a right of publicity 
claim regardless of whether the person’s identity has a commercial val-
ue.90 In the context of postmortem publicity rights, states also vary on 
whether a commercially valuable identity is required to make a claim, 
and, if one is required, whether commercial exploitation during the per-
son’s lifetime is required.91 Commercial exploitation, at least under one 
court’s definition, requires more than mere public use of the identity for 
financial gain; it requires use of the person’s identity outside her main 
career, such as in merchandising.92 
 
88 Fraley, 830 F. Supp. at 799–800, 807–09.  
89 Cohen v. Facebook, Inc., No. C 10–5282 RS, 2011 WL 5117164, at *1–3 (N.D. Cal. 
Oct. 27, 2011).  
90 See, e.g., Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 597.790 (LexisNexis 2013); Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-25-
1103 (West 2015); Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 368–70 (Mo. 2003); Staruski 
v. Cont’l Tel. Co. of Vt., 581 A.2d 266, 269 (Vt. 1990).  
91 See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 3344.1 (Deering 2015) (requiring “deceased personality” to 
have “commercial value at the time” of death or because of the death, without regard to life-
time exploitation); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 597.790 (allowing postmortem right without re-
gard to commercial value); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 1448(H) (West 2014) (requiring “de-
ceased personality” to have “commercial value at the time” of death or because of the death, 
without regard to lifetime exploitation); Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 26.003 (West 2014) (requir-
ing commercial value regardless of whether that value emerged during life or “after that 
time”); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 428–31 (Cal. 1979) (rejecting a postmor-
tem claim by actor’s heirs in part because he did not produce merchandise or otherwise 
commercialize his identity during his lifetime); Martin Luther King, Jr. Ctr. for Soc. Change, 
Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697, 705–06 (Ga. 1982) (rejecting the require-
ment of commercial exploitation to establish postmortem rights). After the California Su-
preme Court rejected the claims by Bela Lugosi’s heirs at common law, California passed a 
statute that retroactively gave postmortem rights to Lugosi and others. See Cal. Civ. Code 
§ 3344.1 (West 2015) (previously § 990).  
92 Lugosi, 603 P.2d. at 428–31. Although the California Supreme Court in Guglielmi v. 
Spelling-Goldberg Productions, 603 P.2d 454, 455 (Cal. 1979), described the holding in Lu-
gosi more broadly, as not allowing any descendible right of publicity, the decision in Lugosi 
itself is more nuanced.  
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2. Violations of the Right 
Some states require that a defendant’s use of a person’s identity be 
“commercial.”93 Of the states that require such a commercial use, there 
are many different ways of expressing the requirement. Some states re-
quire use for a “commercial purpose,”94 others for “financial gain,”95 
“commercial gain,”96 “commercial benefit,”97 “commercial exploita-
tion,”98 “commercial profit,”99 “commercial advantage,”100 “advertising 
purposes, or for the purposes of trade,”101 or “in connection” with goods, 
services, or advertising.102 There is uniform agreement that the use of a 
plaintiff’s identity in an advertisement for a product or service (other 
than one classified as an expressive ad, such as for a movie) meets a 
commercial use requirement, but outside that context there is disagree-
ment about what else constitutes a commercial use and whether liability 
is limited to commercial speech.103 
 
93 See, e.g., Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 597.770, 597.790; Chapman v. Journal Concepts, Inc., 
528 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1096–97 (D. Haw. 2007). 
94 See, e.g., 765 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 1075/10 (West 2015); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
§ 8316 (West 2014). 
95 Martin Luther King, Jr. Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc., 296 S.E.2d at 703. 
96 Brasel v. Hair Co., 976 So. 2d 390, 392 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008). 
97 McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 918–22 (3d Cir. 1994) (applying New Jersey law). 
98 See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 391.170(1) (LexisNexis 2015); Parks v. LaFace Rec-
ords, 329 F.3d 437, 459–60 (6th Cir. 2003) (applying Michigan law). 
99 See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 391.170(2). It is not clear how this standard differs from 
the inter vivos statute’s “commercial exploitation” requirement. 
100 Chapman v. Journal Concepts, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1095–96 (D. Haw. 2007); 
Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 368–71 (Mo. 2003). 
101 See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 50 (Consol. 2015); see also Fla. Stat. § 540.08 (2015) 
(prohibiting use for trade, commercial, or advertising purposes); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 
214, § 3A (West 2015) (prohibiting use for advertising or trade purposes).  
102 See, e.g., Cal Civ. Code § 3344 (Deering 2015); Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 26.011 (West 
2014).  
103 Compare Parks, 329 F.3d at 459–61 (allowing right of publicity claim in context of 
song), with Tyne v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 901 So. 2d 802, 806–09 (Fla. 2005) (holding 
that “commercial purpose” requirement did not apply to motion picture). Compare also 
Brown v. ACMI Pop Div., 873 N.E.2d 954, 955–57, 960–61 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (holding 
that site that licenses photographs has a commercial purpose), with Thompson v. Getty Im-
ages, No. 13 C 1063, 2013 WL 3321612, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 1, 2013) (holding, also under 
Illinois law, that licensing of photographs does not constitute a commercial purpose); see 
also Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, 83 F. Supp. 3d 761, 767–70 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (holding that 
even though a congratulatory spread in a magazine was deemed commercial speech for First 
Amendment purposes, the same spread might not constitute a “commercial purpose” under 
Illinois’s right of publicity statute because it did not propose a specific commercial transac-
tion). For further discussion of the myriad interpretations of what counts as a commercial use 
or purpose, see infra note 151 and accompanying text. 
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Many states take a broader view and recognize right of publicity 
claims without regard to whether a use is commercial, though these 
states usually require that the use be for some sort of “advantage.”104 A 
variety of states expressly include nonprofit solicitations in the sweep of 
their right of publicity statutes.105 Washington State’s statute emphasizes 
that one can infringe the right regardless of whether a use is “for profit 
or not for profit.”106 Even the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competi-
tion, which narrows liability to uses that are for “purposes of trade,” de-
fines such purposes more broadly than only the commercial (in the sense 
of being for-profit). The Restatement includes in its definition of “for 
purposes of trade” uses by “charitable, educational, governmental, fra-
ternal and religious organizations.”107 
The only case involving the right of publicity that has been heard by 
the Supreme Court involved noncommercial speech. In that case, Zac-
chini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting, the Court held that the First 
Amendment was no obstacle to enforcing a right of publicity violation 
against a television station that aired a performance of a “human can-
nonball” as part of its nightly news program.108 In light of Zacchini, it is 
unsurprising that many courts have allowed right of publicity claims in 
the context of noncommercial speech. Such claims have been permitted 
not only for uses in news, but also for those in political campaigns, com-
 
104 See, e.g., Eastwood v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 409, 416–17 (1983); see also 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652C cmt. b (1977) (describing that use need not be for a 
commercial purpose, but could be for “defendant’s own purposes and benefit . . . even 
though the benefit sought to be obtained is not a pecuniary one”). States that have adopted 
this Restatement’s understanding include Colorado, Kansas, Kentucky (common law only), 
Maine, and New Hampshire. Joe Dickerson & Assocs. LLC v. Dittmar, 34 P.3d 995, 997, 
1001–02 (Colo. 2001); Dotson v. McLaughlin, 531 P.2d 1, 5–7 (Kan. 1975); Cheatham v. 
Paisano Publ’ns, Inc., 891 F. Supp. 381, 384, 385–86 (W.D. Ky. 1995); Simpson v. Central 
Me. Motors, 669 A.2d 1324, 1326 (Me. 1996); Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 
1001, 1009–10 (N.H. 2003). 
105 See, e.g., Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2741.01 (LexisNexis 2014) (including uses for “fund-
raising”); Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-25-1105 (West 2015) (including uses for “fund raising” and 
“solicitation of donations”); Utah Code Ann. § 45-3-2 (LexisNexis 2014) (including in its 
definition of advertisement uses to “attract public attention or patronage and includ[ing] a 
list of supporters for a particular cause”). 
106 Wash. Rev. Code § 63.60.050 (2015). 
107 Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 47 (1995). 
108 433 U.S. 562, 563–64, 575–78 (1977).  
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ic book series, videogames, lithographs on t-shirts, commemorative 
busts, and theatrical plays.109 
3. First Amendment and Other Limits 
Sometimes the affirmative elements of a right of publicity claim ex-
plicitly exclude a variety of for-profit enterprises by concluding that they 
are not “commercial” uses. Illinois, for example, expressly excludes uses 
for “non-commercial purposes, including any news, public affairs, or 
sports broadcast or account, or any political campaign.”110 The Restate-
ment (Third) of Unfair Competition Section 47 “ordinarily” excludes 
from its definition of “purposes of trade” the “use of a person’s identity 
in news reporting, commentary, entertainment, works of fiction or non-
fiction, or in advertising that is incidental to such uses,” even though 
these uses are often sold and distributed for a profit.111  
Other state right of publicity laws do not expressly exclude such items 
from their scope at the front end, by concluding that they are not com-
mercial or for trade purposes; instead, they presume that various pre-
ferred uses might fit the commercial-purposes requirements and then 
provide express exemptions for these privileged categories. Common 
exclusions include uses in news, art (usually single or limited copy 
works), books, magazines, and audiovisual works (such as motion pic-
tures).112 
Often, consideration of commerciality is most relevant when courts 
evaluate whether a particular use of another person’s identity is protect-
ed by the First Amendment. Some courts and commentators have 
claimed that if a use is in commercial speech there is no First Amend-
ment defense to right of publicity claims.113 Such a categorical conclu-
 
109 See, e.g., In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 
1268 (9th Cir. 2013) (videogames); Martin Luther King, Jr. Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. 
Heritage Prods., Inc., 694 F.2d 674 (11th Cir. 1983) (busts); Browne v. McCain, 611 
F. Supp. 2d 1062 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (political campaigns); Groucho Marx Prods. v. Day & 
Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (theatrical plays), rev’d on other grounds, 689 
F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982); Comedy III Prods. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001) 
(lithographs on t-shirts); Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003) (comic 
books).  
110 765 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 1075/35(b)(2) (West 2014). 
111 Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 47 (1995). 
112 See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 3344, 3344.1 (Deering 2015); 765 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 
1075/35(b); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 20-202 (2015).  
113 See, e.g., Yeager v. Cingular Wireless, 673 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1096–99 (E.D. Cal. 
2009); cf. Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, 743 F.3d 509, 515–16 (7th Cir. 2014) (accepting that 
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sion, however, can be true under current commercial speech doctrine on-
ly if the commercial speech is false or misleading—a showing that is not 
required for right of publicity claims.114 Under the governing Central 
Hudson test, if the speech is classified as commercial, but not as false or 
misleading (or about unlawful activities), it deserves First Amendment 
protection and intermediate scrutiny review. Only rarely have courts in 
right of publicity cases actually applied the Central Hudson intermediate 
scrutiny test to claims involving commercial speech.115 When noncom-
mercial speech is involved, some courts have applied more robust First 
Amendment review.116 Some of these courts have required proof of ac-
tual malice when the claims involve noncommercial speech, even 
though falsity and deception are not relevant inquiries for right of pub-
licity claims.117 Courts have also disagreed about whether there is a prior 
restraint problem for preliminary injunctions or temporary restraining 
orders in the context of noncommercial speech.118 Some courts engage 
 
First Amendment does not apply to commercial speech in false endorsement claim co-pled 
with right of publicity claim); Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 
F.3d 959, 968–70 (10th Cir. 1996) (distinguishing case from White v. Samsung Electronics 
America, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), because noncommercial speech receives full 
First Amendment protection). 
114 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). For 
further discussion of the Central Hudson analysis see infra notes 138–46, 160–62 and ac-
companying text.  
115 See, e.g., Bosley v. Wildwett.com, 310 F. Supp. 2d 914, 925–29 (N.D. Ohio 2004) 
(holding that use of topless photographs of plaintiff on adult entertainment website and in 
related promotions was commercial speech and that application of the right of publicity in 
that context met the Central Hudson standard); see also Martin H. Redish & Kelsey B. 
Shust, The Right of Publicity and the First Amendment in the Modern Age of Commercial 
Speech, 56 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1443 passim (2015) (criticizing the failure to engage in 
appropriate First Amendment scrutiny in right of publicity cases).  
116 See C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg v. Major League Baseball Adv. Media, 505 F.3d 818, 
823–24 (8th Cir. 2007) (rejecting right of publicity claim on First Amendment grounds and 
holding that use of players’ names and statistics in fantasy sports leagues was “due substan-
tial constitutional protection” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Hoffman v. Capital Cit-
ies/ABC Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1186–89 (9th Cir. 2001) (concluding that fashion spread using 
images of celebrities was not commercial speech and holding that use was protected by the 
First Amendment).  
117 See, e.g., Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1185–89 (applying an actual malice requirement as ba-
sis to reject a right of publicity claim); see also 2 McCarthy, supra note 87, § 8:88–8:89 (crit-
icizing some courts’ application of an actual malice standard to right of publicity claims).  
118 See Bosley, 310 F. Supp. 2d at 929–31 (discussing that there was no prior restraint 
problem because commercial speech was at issue, but noting that many courts and the main 
treatise on the subject did not think there was a prior restraint problem even in the context of 
noncommercial speech). 
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in ad hoc balancing to determine whether a right of publicity claim sur-
vives First Amendment scrutiny.119 
In recent years, three independent tests have developed to analyze 
whether the First Amendment protects a given use against a right of pub-
licity claim. Each test considers, at least in part, commerciality. None, 
however, expressly limits its analysis to the context of noncommercial 
speech. The first test is the predominant use test, which has been adopt-
ed by Missouri. This test focuses on the commercial nature of the use 
and whether the commercial or the informative or expressive compo-
nents predominate.120 The analysis considers whether the primary pur-
pose of the use is to “exploit[] the commercial value of an individual’s 
identity” or to “make an expressive comment on or about a celebrity.”121 
In adopting this test, the Missouri Supreme Court noted that uses in 
“news, entertainment, and creative works” are usually expressive, while 
uses in advertising are almost always commercial.122 Despite setting up 
this dichotomy, the court held that the use of a plaintiff’s name in an en-
tertainment product—a comic book—and the surrounding marketing of 
that comic book series could be a predominantly commercial use to at-
tract consumers to the product.123 
 
119 See, e.g., C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., 505 F.3d at 823–24 (“balanc[ing]” the public 
interest in using players’ names and statistics in fantasy sports league with the players’ inter-
ests in controlling the use of that information); Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball 
Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 970–76 (10th Cir. 1996) (“balanc[ing] the magnitude of the 
speech restriction [produced by the right of publicity] against the asserted governmental in-
terest in protecting the intellectual property right” and concluding that the speech value of 
parody trading cards outweighed the injury to the baseball players’ publicity interests). 
120 Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 373–74 (Mo. 2003); see also Mark S. Lee, 
Agents of Chaos: Judicial Confusion in Defining the Right of Publicity—Free Speech Inter-
face, 23 Loy. L.A. Ent. L. Rev. 471, 500 (2003) (arguing that if a product predominantly ex-
ploits the commercial value of an individual’s identity, it should be held to violate the right 
of publicity and be unprotected by the First Amendment, but if the predominant purpose is to 
make an expressive comment, the expressive values “could be given greater weight”). The 
court also indicated that noncommercial speech was “fully protected” by the First Amend-
ment, while commercial speech was usually not. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d at 373.  
121 TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d at 374–75 (citation omitted). 
122 Id. at 373–75.  
123 Id. The court reversed the judgment notwithstanding the verdict and remanded for a 
new trial. A new jury trial awarded $15 million to the plaintiff, and the case subsequently 
settled for $5 million. Donna Walter, Final Twist: Suit Settled for $5 Million in Favor of St. 
Louis Blues Hockey Player, St. Louis Daily Rec., Feb. 16, 2007, available at 
http://bi.galegroup.com/global/article/GALE%7CA159363761/6a44deefd6a0c4674497fb06b
bb?u=multnomah1. 
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The second test for evaluating First Amendment defenses is the trans-
formative use test. California adopted this test in Comedy III Produc-
tions v. Gary Saderup, Inc.124 The test extracts one consideration from 
copyright’s fair use analysis—whether a use transforms the underlying 
work—and imports it to the right of publicity context.125 The test focus-
es on whether the use “merely appropriates a celebrity’s economic val-
ue” or instead transforms the identity into a “creative product.”126 This is 
“essentially a balancing test between the First Amendment and the right 
of publicity based on whether the work in question adds significant crea-
tive elements so as to be transformed into something more than a mere 
celebrity likeness or imitation.”127 The consideration of whether the de-
fendant is trying to make something new or simply trying to usurp the 
value of the public personality turns at least in part on whether the use or 
work is commercially exploitative or creatively transformative.128 
The third test for evaluating a First Amendment defense in right of 
publicity cases is the relatedness test set forth in the Restatement (Third) 
of Unfair Competition. The Restatement concludes that “if the name or 
likeness is used solely to attract attention to a work that is not related to 
the identified person, the user may be subject to liability for a use of the 
other’s identity.”129 The relatedness test has been applied in both com-
mercial and noncommercial speech contexts,130 and is not as clearly tied 
to commerciality as the other tests. Nevertheless, often its application 
 
124 P.3d 797, 807–11 (Cal. 2001). The court in Comedy III oddly seemed to apply a “ra-
tional basis” analysis to the overall constitutionality of the right of publicity statute. See id. 
at 805. The court then engaged in a “balanc[ing]” of the “interests at stake” using the trans-
formativeness test. Id. at 805–11.  
125 Id. at 807–11.  
126 Winter v. D.C. Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 477 (Cal. 2003) (emphasis added). 
127 Id. at 475 (citation omitted). 
128 Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 807–11. Determining whether a use is transformative is 
challenging—particularly because it is not clear whether the transformation has to be to the 
underlying identity or if the transformation can be understood more broadly as encompassing 
the use of an untransformed identity in a new context, such as in a biographical motion pic-
ture. The test is better understood as a transformative work test, rather than a transformative 
use test. Cf. id. at 391, 404, 407, 408 (referring mostly to the “work” being transformative). 
129 Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 47 cmt. c (1995).  
130 See, e.g., Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1004–05 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding under 
Oregon law that the right of publicity would apply to the use of a celebrity name in a movie 
title only if the use was “‘wholly unrelated’ to the movie or was ‘simply a disguised com-
mercial advertisement for the sale of goods or services’”(citation omitted)); Yeager v. Cin-
gular Wireless, 673 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1099 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (evaluating the relatedness of a 
reference to famous pilot, Chuck Yeager, in an advertisement for Cingular Wireless ser-
vices). 
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has been either disfavored or seemingly barred in the context of com-
mercial speech.131 
*** 
In sum, the right of publicity has been applied outside the context of 
commercial speech, and courts have inconsistently treated commercial 
uses across and even within states when considering right of publicity 
laws. Despite the many areas of trademark, copyright, and right of pub-
licity law that differentiate uses and rights on the basis of commerciality, 
none of these laws actually limits liability or rights to commercial 
speech, even when the lesser First Amendment scrutiny of commercial 
speech is used to justify differential treatment. Before considering in 
more depth the appropriateness of such distinctions, it is necessary to 
tease apart the myriad definitions of “commercial” in the IP context. 
II. DEFINING “COMMERCIAL” IN IP—A TAXONOMY 
As the preceding discussion reveals, there is no overarching or con-
sistent definition of “commercial” in IP law. Instead, “commercial” has 
been used to mean many different things. This creates a number of chal-
lenges, given the frequent overlap of IP claims in intellectual property 
cases. For example, in the Harry Potter parties discussed in the Intro-
duction, there are possible copyright, right of publicity, and trademark 
claims, and as to each claim various First Amendment (or First Amend-
ment-infused) defenses. It therefore would be useful to have considera-
tions of commerciality at least somewhat harmonized across these 
claims, particularly when the very same defenses are at issue, such as 
First Amendment defenses. Even if it were reasonable for these areas of 
law and different statutes to mean different things by the word “com-
mercial,” within the same body of law and the same statute (especially 
the same subsection) the word should have the same meaning. Yet, as 
seen in Part I, this has not been the case. 
In this Part, I bring the different definitions and understandings to-
gether to see the overlapping, as well as distinct, meanings of “commer-
 
131 Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004–05 (suggesting that uses in commercial advertisements are 
likely to be “unrelated”); Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 47 cmt. c (1995) 
(considering the relatedness of a use only in the context of “news, entertainment, and crea-
tive works” and not providing any examples in which the test has been applied to commer-
cial speech).  
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cial” in IP. The five primary meanings of “commercial” used in IP laws 
are (1) a use in commerce; (2) commercial speech; (3) for profit; (4) a 
use that causes market harm; and (5) a use that is of lesser value or is 
nonexpressive.132 Although these definitions are distinct, there is fre-
quently a lack of clarity in practice about which definition applies to a 
given legal claim or defense. “Commercial” is sometimes used to indi-
cate a combination of these definitions. For example, in the context of 
the Lanham Act the requirement that a use be commercial may indicate 
a requirement that it be a use in commerce (definition one), and also that 
it be commercial speech (definition two) or a use for profit (definition 
three). 
A. Commercial as a Use in Commerce 
Sometimes the use of the term “commercial” is jurisdictional in na-
ture and indicates that a use must meet the requirements of a use in 
commerce for the purposes of the Commerce Clause. This meaning aris-
es in federal trademark and false advertising laws because Congress’s 
power to legislate in this area is constitutionally limited by the Com-
merce Clause.133 A use in commerce—usually requiring an interstate 
use—is required to acquire federal trademark rights, to register a mark 
with the PTO, to establish trademark infringement or dilution, and to 
make a false advertising claim.134 
Patent and copyright laws are enacted under a separate grant of pow-
er, the Progress Clause,135 and therefore do not require nor focus on 
commerciality in this sense. If Congress expands these laws beyond the 
 
132 There are other secondary meanings of “commercial” that are used less frequently, for 
example, to indicate that something has been made public or sold. Because these other uses 
of the term appear less frequently and are ultimately tangential to commerciality, I do not 
focus on them. 
133 In re Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879) (striking down a trademark act as unconsti-
tutional because it was legislated through the Progress Clause, which does not cover trade-
marks, but leaving open the possibility that it could be constitutional under the Commerce 
Clause); see also Browne v. McCain, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1079 (C.D. Cal. 2009); U.S. Pa-
tent & Trademark Office, Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure §§ 901.03, 
1301.03(b) (October 2014). 
134 A use may also be made in commerce with foreign states or with an Indian tribe. See 
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8; see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125, 1127 (2012) (Lanham Act §§ 32, 
43, 45); Kelly-Brown v. Winfrey, 717 F.3d 295, 305–07 (2d Cir. 2013); Int’l Bancorp, v. 
Societe des Bains de Mer, 329 F.3d 359, 363–70 (4th Cir. 2003); Larry Harmon Pictures 
Corp. v. Williams Rest. Corp., 929 F.2d 662, 663–66 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
135 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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boundaries of the Progress Clause—if that is constitutionally permissi-
ble—then Congress would need to conform to the boundaries of the 
Commerce Clause.136 If Congress decides to address the patchwork of 
right of publicity laws and adopt a federal right, such legislation would 
also be limited by the Commerce Clause and require a use in com-
merce.137 
B. Commercial as Commercial Speech 
At the other end of the spectrum from the broad use in commerce def-
inition of “commercial” is the narrow use of “commercial” to mean only 
“commercial speech.” Commercial speech has largely been defined by 
the Supreme Court in the context of the First Amendment. Frequently, 
courts refer to commercial speech as speech that does “no more than 
propose a commercial transaction.”138 At other times, courts adopt a 
broader view of commercial speech, particularly in the context of deter-
mining how to classify speech that has both commercial and noncom-
mercial aspects. Analyses of such “mixed messages” often employ the 
Supreme Court’s Bolger test, which considers three factors: (1) whether 
the speech is advertising; (2) whether the speech refers to a specific 
product; and (3) whether the speaker has an economic motivation for the 
 
136 The issue of whether the Progress Clause limits Congress’s power has been a matter of 
debate. Compare Thomas B. Nachbar, Intellectual Property and Constitutional Norms, 104 
Colum. L. Rev. 272 (2004) (contending that Congress is free to legislate in copyright and 
patent arena via Commerce Clause), with Jeanne C. Fromer, The Intellectual Property 
Clause’s External Limitations, 61 Duke L.J. 1329, 1331–36 (2012) (disagreeing with Na-
chbar and others and concluding that there are constitutional limits on IP legislation), and 
Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The Intellectual 
Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1119 (conclud-
ing that there are numerous limits on congressional legislation that emanate from the “Intel-
lectual Property Clause”). 
137 Many scholars and practitioners have advocated for the adoption of a federal right that 
preempts state laws. See, e.g., Tamlin Bason, Should Congress or Supreme Court Help Curb 
Ongoing Right of Publicity Free-For-All?, 88 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 1558 
(Oct. 17, 2014) (describing interest by scholars and practitioners in federal right of publicity 
legislation); see also supra note 12. 
138 Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2639 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted) (cit-
ing Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 761–62 (1976)); 
see also Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002, 1017 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(applying this test in the context of the Lanham Act); Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League 
Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 970 (10th Cir. 1996) (applying it in the context of right 
of publicity). 
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speech.139 Speech need not meet all three of these criteria to be consid-
ered commercial.140 In Part III, I will engage with the challenges pre-
sented by importing (as a jurisdictional hurdle) a term that has such un-
certain boundaries, but here my point is simply that courts—interpreting 
the relevant statutes and common law—sometimes mean commercial 
speech when they refer to commercial uses and limits, particularly in the 
context of the Lanham Act and the right of publicity. 
As described, some courts have held that the Lanham Act applies only 
to commercial speech.141 These courts have required plaintiffs in in-
fringement, dilution, and false advertising cases to show that a defend-
ant’s use is commercial speech. Whether a use is commercial speech has 
also been considered when courts evaluate defenses to Lanham Act 
claims. Some courts have suggested that there is no First Amendment 
defense for uses in commercial speech.142 The Lanham Act’s dilution 
provision has an explicit exemption for “noncommercial uses,” which is 
often interpreted as not “commercial speech.”143 
In the context of the right of publicity, some courts have suggested 
that liability is limited to uses in commercial speech, particularly to uses 
in commercial advertising.144 Even when the right applies more broadly 
than commercial speech, some courts have concluded that the First 
Amendment does not apply or applies in a more limited fashion in the 
context of commercial speech.145 In contrast, in the context of copyright 
law, “commercial” is not used to refer to commercial speech.146 
C. Commercial as For Profit 
The term “commercial” is often used broadly to refer to any uses con-
ducted with the purpose to profit from them, usually in the monetary 
sense of financially gaining from the uses. Numerous for-profit uses ex-
ceed the boundaries of commercial speech, such as uses in motion pic-
 
139 Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66–68 (1983); Jordan v. Jewel Food 
Stores, 743 F.3d 509, 516–17 (7th Cir. 2014) (applying Bolger in Lanham Act and right of 
publicity case). 
140 See id. at 517. 
141 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
142 See, e.g., Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1017–18 (3d Cir. 2008); Kelley 
Blue Book v. Car-Smarts, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 278, 291 (C.D. Cal. 1992). 
143 See supra notes 44–53 and accompanying text.  
144 See, e.g., Tyne v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 901 So. 2d 802, 808–10 (Fla. 2005). 
145 See supra notes 113–14 and accompanying text. 
146 See supra notes 66–79, infra notes 146–48 and accompanying text. 
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tures, fine arts, music, news, and books. In copyright, the primary mean-
ing of “commercial” is to indicate a for-profit use. The Copyright Act 
does not explicitly define the term “commercial,” nor does it define a 
variety of related terms, such as “for profit” and “nonprofit,” that appear 
in the statute. Nevertheless, their meanings can be discerned. The fair 
use section of the Copyright Act expressly contrasts uses of a “commer-
cial nature” from those that are “nonprofit educational” uses.147 Some 
courts have taken a broad view of what counts as commercial, categoriz-
ing even nonprofit entities as commercial if they get something for free 
that others customarily pay to use.148 
In the context of the Lanham Act, when courts have allowed claims 
outside the commercial speech context, they have sometimes limited 
claims to commercial uses in the sense of for-profit ones.149 This has of-
ten required the uses to be in connection with the sales of goods or ser-
vices with the intent of financially profiting from those sales.150 Similar-
ly, when the right of publicity has not been limited to commercial 
speech, it has often been limited to uses for a “commercial purpose” in 
the sense of being done for the financial benefit of the user.151 
 
147 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
148 See, e.g., Soc’y of the Holy Transfiguration Monastery v. Gregory, 689 F.3d 29, 61 (1st 
Cir. 2012) (concluding that copying of religious texts for purposes of worship was commer-
cial); cf. Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1261–68 (11th Cir. 2014) (hold-
ing that Georgia State’s use of copyrighted materials in online course reserves was “for-
profit,” but not commercial). For a critique of this reliance on customary licensing practices 
see Jennifer E. Rothman, The Questionable Use of Custom in Intellectual Property, 93 Va. 
L. Rev. 1899, 1932–44, 1946–82 (2007); see also James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights 
Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 Yale L.J. 882, 895–98 (2007). 
149 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.  
150 See supra notes 25–29 and accompanying text.  
151 “Commercial purpose” has been interpreted differently in different jurisdictions and 
even within jurisdictions. Sometimes the term is interpreted broadly as having any financial 
motivation, while at other times it has been interpreted quite narrowly to be even more lim-
ited than the definition of “commercial speech.” See, e.g., Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, 
Inc., 769 F.2d 1128, 1138–39 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding a commercial purpose in the context 
of a use in a magazine); Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, No. 10 C 340, 2015 WL 1204282, at 
*2–4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2015) (interpreting Illinois’s right of publicity statute more narrowly 
than commercial speech and suggesting that to meet the commercial purpose requirement the 
speech may require soliciting the purchase of a particular product or service); Comedy III 
Prods. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 802–811 (Cal. 2001) (concluding that sale of t-
shirt was for a “commercial purpose,” even though the use was not commercial speech); see 
also supra notes 93–103 and accompanying text.  
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D. Commercial as Causing (Market) Harm 
Some courts have taken an even broader view of what is commercial, 
considering “commercial” not only uses that are for financial profit, but 
also those that cause a commercial (as in economic) injury to the plain-
tiff. This is particularly true in copyright law. As discussed, some courts 
have considered not-for-profit uses commercial if there is a failure to 
pay a customary licensing fee for using the copyrighted material, or 
when there is other market harm to a copyright holder.152 In Harper & 
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, the Supreme Court rejected 
First Amendment and fair use defenses for publishing excerpts from 
President Ford’s then-unpublished memoirs in the Nation and highlight-
ed that the use of excerpts in a news-oriented magazine was commercial. 
The Court explained: 
In arguing that the purpose of news reporting is not purely commer-
cial, The Nation misses the point entirely. The crux of the prof-
it/nonprofit distinction is not whether the sole motive of the use is 
monetary gain but whether the user stands to profit from exploitation 
of the copyrighted material without paying the customary price.153 
The customary pricing analysis focuses not only on the benefit to the de-
fendant, but also, and primarily, on the potential lost fees and ripple ef-
fect of such nonpayments on the plaintiff. 
E. Commercial as Low Value or Non-Expressive 
Courts often contrast what is commercial with what is valuable, in the 
sense of being informative or expressive or artistic. In the context of the 
right of publicity, several states expressly distinguish between “expres-
sive” and “commercial” uses, with commercial uses thought to be non-
expressive and therefore of lesser value. Pennsylvania’s right of publici-
ty law, for example, excludes from its definition of “commercial or 
advertising purpose” all “expressive work[s],” which include “literary, 
dramatic, fictional, historical, audiovisual or musical work[s],” news, 
and works of fine art.154 In applying this Pennsylvania law, a federal 
court concluded that a documentary about a videogame fell on the com-
 
152 See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
153 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985) (citations 
omitted).  
154 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8316(e) (West 2014). 
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mercial purpose end of the spectrum because it was not sufficiently 
“journalistic” in nature.155 In Doe v. TCI Cablevision, the Missouri Su-
preme Court (in the context of rejecting a First Amendment defense for 
the use of the plaintiff’s identity in a comic book) explained that the 
“threshold legal question” when evaluating a First Amendment defense 
to a right of publicity claim is “whether the use of a person’s name and 
identity is ‘expressive,’ in which case it is fully protected, or ‘commer-
cial,’ in which case it is generally not protected.”156 Courts similarly 
contrast that which is “expressive” from that which is “commercial” in 
trademark cases. Courts particularly consider and favor expressive uses 
over those deemed commercial when considering defenses to infringe-
ment or dilution claims.157 Such distinctions are less frequent in copy-
right law, where courts have been more reluctant to make such explicit 
aesthetic and qualitative judgments.158 
*** 
I do not attempt in this project to resolve the doctrinal confusion be-
tween these various meanings of “commercial” by determining once and 
for all what definition is the “correct” one or the appropriate one (or 
ones) in each instance; instead, my aim in this Part has been to stream-
line and clarify our understanding of the different meanings and uses of 
the term “commercial” across these three major IP areas. This taxonomy 
is useful for applying the law in these different areas, but it is also cru-
cial to the normative discussion that follows. One cannot address the 
question of whether it is appropriate to differentiate treatment on the ba-
sis of commerciality without understanding what is meant by the term. 
III. QUESTIONING IP’S COMMERCIAL/NONCOMMERCIAL HIERARCHY 
Although underdeveloped by courts and scholars, there are several 
justifications for distinguishing commercial speech from noncommercial 
speech and commercial uses from noncommercial ones in the context of 
 
155 Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 2d 491, 500–01 (E.D. Pa. 2007), aff’d, 542 
F.3d 1007 (3d Cir. 2008). 
156 Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 373–74 (Mo. 2003). 
157 See, e.g., Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 998–1000 (2d Cir. 1989) (concluding that 
“artistic works” deserve greater First Amendment protection than do “ordinary commercial 
products”). 
158 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 582–83 (1994) (quoting 
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographic Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903)). 
COPYRIGHT © 2015, VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION  
1966 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 101:1929 
IP. In this Part, I evaluate each of the major justifications, focusing less 
on the doctrinal basis for distinguishing commercial and noncommercial 
speech/uses, and more on the broader theoretical underpinnings that 
could justify making such distinctions. 
One could make a variety of statute-based arguments for various lim-
its, particularly in the context of the Lanham Act (though sadly that 
would provide only limited clarity). One could also consider a variety of 
arguments rooted in constitutional doctrine. I will consider some of the 
latter because they raise larger questions about the role of free speech in 
determining when commerciality should matter, and they also are the 
most frequently invoked to justify the disfavoring of commercial speech 
and uses in IP cases. My primary focus, however, is on the more funda-
mental question of how and why IP law should differentiate uses on the 
basis of commerciality, rather than on whether it is permissible to do so. 
In this Part I focus on the two dominant meanings of “commercial” in 
IP law—“commercial” as commercial speech, and “commercial” as a 
for-profit use. The meaning of commercial as a use in commerce is both 
normatively and doctrinally uncontroversial; it is also largely circum-
scribed (at least at the moment) to trademark law, which is authorized 
through the Commerce Clause. I therefore will not further explore this 
meaning of “commercial.” I also will not consider, as independent defi-
nitions, market harm or low-value uses, because these are better under-
stood as justifications for distinguishing commercial uses rather than as 
independent definitions of commerciality. I separated these out in my 
taxonomy because courts have used them as definitions, but they are bet-
ter analyzed as justifications and I will treat them as such here. I also 
will focus on for-profit in the sense of uses in which a party seeks a fi-
nancial gain. Other meanings of for-profit status do not provide mean-
ingful distinctions between noncommercial and commercial uses and 
conflict with longstanding and common definitions of “commercial.”159 
The primary justifications for distinguishing commercial from non-
commercial speech, and commercial from noncommercial uses (in the 
“for-profit” sense) are rooted in concerns over free speech, value, harm 
and broader principles of fairness. I will consider each of these justifica-
 
159 See, e.g., “Commercial,” Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2015), http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/commercial (defining “commercial” as “related to or used in the 
buying and selling of goods and services”; “concerned with earning money”; or “relating to 
or based on the amount of profit that something earns”).  
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tions and why none provides a convincing basis for the current distinc-
tions rooted in commerciality. 
A. The First Amendment and the Commercial Speech Doctrine 
Much of the disfavoring of commercial uses in IP is justified by refer-
ence (both explicit and implicit) to the commercial speech doctrine as it 
has developed in First Amendment jurisprudence independent of IP law. 
Before engaging in a broader analysis of whether it makes sense as a 
normative matter to differentiate uses on the basis of whether they occur 
in commercial speech, it is important to consider two things: first, the 
legitimacy of claims that such distinctions are required for various IP 
laws to be constitutional; and, second, some of the challenges that come 
with relying on the commercial speech doctrine. In this Section, I will 
also consider the fact that, even if one thought the commercial speech 
dividing line were defensible, knowable, and here to stay, IP laws regu-
larly exceed its boundaries. To truly rely on commercial speech to justi-
fy differential treatment in IP would therefore require adherence to its 
limited scope. 
1. IP Laws Are Constitutional Even if Applied to Noncommercial Speech 
One basis for using commercial speech as a dividing line in IP law is 
a claim that the relevant IP law would otherwise be an unconstitutional 
restriction on speech. The First Amendment does not usually permit 
content-based restrictions on noncommercial speech absent a specific 
exception or after surviving an often-fatal strict scrutiny review.160 In 
contrast, commercial speech is protected by the First Amendment, but is 
treated as a second-class citizen, at least in theory, if not always in prac-
tice. False or misleading commercial speech and commercial speech 
about unlawful activities receive no First Amendment protection.161 
Other commercial speech is subject to lesser intermediate scrutiny under 
the Central Hudson test.162 
For this reason, numerous courts, and some scholars, have claimed 
that the Lanham Act’s restrictions on speech are constitutional only be-
 
160 See McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2548 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
161 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). 
162 Id. (holding that restrictions on truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech about lawful 
activities are constitutional only if the government establishes a substantial interest and the re-
striction directly advances that state interest without being more extensive than necessary). 
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cause they are limited to commercial speech.163 The claim is that both 
false and misleading commercial speech receive no First Amendment 
protection; therefore, trademark infringement laws (based on likely con-
fusion) and false advertising laws (contained in the same subsection and 
based on falsehood or misleadingness) constitutionally restrict speech 
when applied to commercial speech.164 
The commercial speech doctrine also has been used to justify dilution 
law, which is not based on misleading or false speech. At the time that 
the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (“FTDA”) was first proposed and 
debated, some members of Congress, as well as lawyers involved in the 
provision’s drafting, worried that the provision might violate the First 
Amendment if it were applied to noncommercial speech. In commenting 
on the proposed FTDA, Senator Orrin Hatch stated that dilution law 
would not raise serious First Amendment concerns because it would 
“not prohibit or threaten noncommercial expression, such as parody, sat-
ire, editorial and other forms of expression that are not a part of a com-
mercial transaction.”165 In a submission by the International Trademark 
Association, the organization suggested that dilution law would be un-
constitutional if applied to noncommercial speech.166 The noncommer-
 
163 See, e.g., TMI, Inc. v. Maxwell, 368 F.3d 433, 436 n.2 (5th Cir. 2004); Taubman Co. v. 
Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770, 774 (6th Cir. 2003); Rebecca Tushnet, Trademark Law as Com-
mercial Speech Regulation, 58 S.C. L. Rev. 737, 738–39 (2007) (suggesting that trademark 
law would be significantly altered (and weakened) if it were not analyzed under the lesser 
speech protection afforded to commercial speech); Rebecca Tushnet, Truth and Advertising: 
The Lanham Act and Commercial Speech Doctrine, in Trademark Law and Theory: A 
Handbook of Contemporary Research 294, 294–95 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis 
eds., 2008) (suggesting that eliminating the commercial speech distinction in constitutional 
law could “invalid[ate] a large amount of modern trademark and advertising law” unless 
First Amendment analysis is “recalibrated”); see also supra notes 15, 29 and accompanying 
text; cf. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Cheap Spirits, Cigarettes, and Free Speech: The Implications 
of 44 Liquormart, 1996 Sup. Ct. Rev. 123, 152–56 (suggesting that without the commercial 
speech doctrine it would be more difficult to regulate “misleading” (though not false) adver-
tising). 
164 Arguably, trademark infringement does not rest on falsehood (or even misleadingness) 
because the standard of likely confusion is a lower bar. See Ramsey, supra note 17, at 416–
17 (concluding that trademark infringement does not require a showing that speech is false 
or misleading). Such a conclusion further shores up arguments that there is not a constitu-
tional requirement to limit the action to commercial speech.  
165 141 Cong. Rec. S19,310 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995). 
166 Summary of Testimony of the International Trademark Ass’n on H.R. 1295 & 1270, 
July 19, 1995, available at 1995 WL 435750.  
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cial use exemption to the dilution provision purportedly was added to 
address such concerns.167 
Similar claims have been made in the right of publicity context—that 
the right would survive constitutional review only if it were limited to 
commercial speech.168 In Tyne v. Time Warner Entertainment Co., the 
Florida Supreme Court narrowed the scope of the state’s right of publici-
ty law to commercial speech (in the sense of a direct promotion of a 
product or service) to comport with that court’s view of First Amend-
ment restrictions and the lesser protection afforded to commercial 
speech.169 Some scholars have also suggested that the right of publicity 
does not raise constitutional problems because it usually (some claim 
only) covers commercial speech.170 
Tellingly, no such claims have been made about copyright laws. Alt-
hough the 1976 Copyright Act was drafted and debated in a world in 
which commercial speech received no First Amendment protection, 
copyright laws have never been limited to commercial speech and its 
speech limits have never been justified on those grounds.171 
Despite the claims that the Lanham Act and right of publicity laws 
must be limited to commercial speech, as a doctrinal matter IP laws are 
constitutional even if applied to noncommercial speech. Most exceptions 
to the First Amendment involve noncommercial speech. The exceptions 
for true threats, defamation, incitement, and obscenity most often apply 
in noncommercial (speech) contexts. Of particular relevance here, prop-
erty laws—especially IP laws—have often been treated, for better or 
worse, as First Amendment trump cards.172 Copyright law restricts non-
 
167 See supra notes 44–48 and accompanying text.  
168 See, e.g., Tyne v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 901 So. 2d 802, 808–10 (Fla. 2005); Vo-
lokh, supra note 81, at 929–30. 
169 901 So. 2d at 808–10. 
170 See supra note 82.  
171 Virginia Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 
(1976), the case that held that commercial speech is protected by the First Amendment, was 
decided in May 1976 and the Copyright Act of 1976 was passed in September of that year. 
The 1976 Act, however, had been debated and drafted over the preceding two decades dur-
ing the Valentine v. Christensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), era, in which commercial speech re-
ceived no First Amendment protection. 
172 See Eugene Volokh, The First Amendment and Related Statutes 221–29 (4th ed. 2011); 
John O. McGinnis, The Once and Future Property-Based Vision of the First Amendment, 63 
U. Chi. L. Rev. 49, 79–85 (1996); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Prop-
erty: Some Thoughts After Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 Hous. L. Rev. 697 
(2003).  
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commercial speech every day, but no one contends that it is unconstitu-
tional because it has been applied beyond the boundaries of commercial 
speech. In fact, the First Amendment has little to no independent role in 
restricting copyright law.173 
Even though copyright benefits from a specific grant of congressional 
power—the Progress Clause—a similar analysis has been used in IP 
cases that do not involve copyright or patent law. In the context of 
trademark law, courts have often held that “speech that misleads or cre-
ates confusion is not protected under the First Amendment,” even if it 
occurs in noncommercial speech.174 Although the Supreme Court has 
not directly addressed the issue, it has suggested in a variety of ways that 
the Lanham Act is constitutional when applied to noncommercial 
speech. In a case involving a quasi-trademark statute—one that provides 
protection for the word “Olympics” and other related marks regardless 
of likelihood of confusion—the Court held that the United States Olym-
pic Committee (“USOC”) could prevent the San Francisco Arts & Ath-
letics (“SFAA”) organization from using the word “Olympics” in the 
context of an Olympics-like event for gay athletes.175 Although the ma-
jority opinion referred to the SFAA as a commercial enterprise and at 
times categorized the relevant speech as commercial, it acknowledged 
that the name of the event, the athletic event itself, and the related theat-
rical events were noncommercial speech.176 The Court nevertheless con-
cluded that the First Amendment did not protect the use of the word 
“Olympics” because of the USOC’s property rights in the word. The 
Court explicitly rejected the claim that the noncommercial status of the 
speech mattered for First Amendment purposes: 
The SFAA’s expressive use of the word cannot be divorced from the 
value the USOC’s efforts have given to it. The mere fact that the 
SFAA claims an expressive, as opposed to a purely commercial, pur-
pose does not give it a First Amendment right to “appropriat[e] to it-
 
173 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 218–21 (2003); see also Jennifer E. Rothman, Liber-
ating Copyright: Thinking Beyond Free Speech, 95 Cornell L. Rev. 463, 476–92 (2009) (dis-
cussing the limited role of the First Amendment in copyright). 
174 See, e.g., Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, 214 F.3d 658, 672 (5th Cir. 2000); 
Hershey Co. v. Friends of Steve Hershey, 33 F. Supp. 3d 588, 594–95 (D. Md. 2014); see 
also supra notes 17, 30–33 and accompanying text.  
175 S.F. Arts & Athletics v. U.S. Olympic Comm. (SFAA), 483 U.S. 522 (1987); see also 
36 U.S.C. § 220506 (2012) (stating that the USOC has the exclusive right to use the word 
“Olympic”). 
176 See SFAA, 483 U.S. at 535–41; id. at 548–71 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
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self the harvest of those who have sown.” The USOC’s right to pro-
hibit use of the word ‘Olympic’ in the promotion of athletic events is 
at the core of its legitimate property right.177 
The Court’s decision in this case unquestionably challenges the claim 
that the Lanham Act would be unconstitutional if applied to noncom-
mercial speech.178 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v. Alvarez pro-
vides further support for a broad IP exception to the First Amendment 
that does not turn on commerciality, particularly in the context of trade-
mark law (including dilution claims which do not require a demonstra-
tion of confusion or deception).179 In Alvarez, the Court struck down the 
Stolen Valor Act on First Amendment grounds. The Stolen Valor Act 
made it a crime to falsely claim to have received a military or congres-
sional Medal of Honor. Despite the law being held unconstitutional, a 
majority of the Justices concluded that false speech can be penalized 
even when the speech at issue is not commercial. Justice Breyer’s con-
currence (joined by Justice Kagan) specifically analogized to trademark 
law, suggesting that when a harm is shown (such as likely confusion or 
dilution), false statements can constitutionally be penalized without re-
gard to their commerciality.180 He noted that the Lanham Act can consti-
tutionally restrict even political speech.181 In his dissent, Justice Alito 
(joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas) concluded that the Stolen Valor 
Act was constitutional as written and compared it to trademark dilution 
law: “Surely it was reasonable for Congress to conclude that the goal of 
preserving the integrity of our country’s top military honors is at least as 
worthy as that of protecting the prestige associated with fancy watches 
and designer handbags.”182 Although the Justices did not directly con-
front the issue in Alvarez, their dicta strongly suggest that at least five 
 
177 See id. at 541 (majority opinion) (quoting Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 
U.S. 215, 239–40 (1918)) (alteration in original).  
178 There is much to criticize about the Court’s decision in SFAA, but it is nevertheless tell-
ing about where current constitutional doctrine sits. For one such critique, see Rochelle 
Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 
65 Notre Dame L. Rev. 397, 398–99, 410–21 (1990) (criticizing the decision because of its 
failure to consider the unique expressive value of the word “Olympics”).  
179 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). 
180 Id. at 2553–56 (Breyer, J., concurring).  
181 Id. at 2556.  
182 Id. at 2559 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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members of the Court think that trademark and related laws can consti-
tutionally apply to noncommercial contexts. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad-
casting Co. demonstrates the same lack of concern about applying right 
of publicity laws to noncommercial speech.183 In Zacchini, the Court 
held that the First Amendment did not insulate a news program from lia-
bility for broadcasting the plaintiff’s human-cannonball routine.184 The 
Court in Zacchini expressly endorsed treating the First Amendment 
analysis in right of publicity cases similarly to that in the context of pa-
tent and copyright laws.185 The decision in Zacchini, rejecting a First 
Amendment defense in the context of news reporting, has led many oth-
er courts to allow right of publicity claims in an array of noncommercial 
speech settings, such as in political advertisements, comic books, litho-
graphs on t-shirts, and mass-produced sculptures.186 
This view of IP as a property right that trumps free speech concerns is 
widely accepted by courts. Although one could challenge such conclu-
sions on normative grounds as insufficiently protective of free speech, 
doctrinal claims that IP laws are unconstitutional unless limited to com-
mercial speech do not stand up against this well-established body of law. 
If we nevertheless want to give preference to noncommercial speech, it 
may be constitutional to do so, but more convincing reasons need to be 
provided for doing so than the erroneous claim that such distinctions are 
constitutionally required. 
2. The Challenges of Commercial Speech 
There are also many reasons not to rely on the commercial speech 
doctrine to delineate IP laws, even if one can do so. First, the differential 
treatment of commercial speech has been narrowed in recent years and 
some Supreme Court Justices have advocated for providing full speech 
protection to commercial speech.187 Recent cases appear to give more 
 
183 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).  
184 Id. at 578–79. 
185 Id. at 574–77. 
186 See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
187 See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2664, 2667–72 (2011) (suggest-
ing that “[c]ommercial speech is no exception” to “heightened scrutiny” and striking down 
law restricting commercial speech even though dissent thought law would survive interme-
diate scrutiny purportedly applied to commercial speech); Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 
535 U.S. 357, 368 (2002) (noting continued doubts about validity of Central Hudson analy-
sis and listing many of Court’s own opinions that question the validity of the doctrine); Unit-
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robust scrutiny to regulations of commercial speech than the “intermedi-
ate scrutiny” that supposedly applies.188 The Court’s 2011 decision in 
Sorrell v. IMS Health makes clear that “[t]he First Amendment requires 
heightened scrutiny whenever the government creates ‘a regulation of 
speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys.’ . . . 
Commercial speech is no exception.”189 The recent solicitousness to 
corporations may also signal further trimming of the doctrine in the fu-
ture.190 
Second, the commercial speech doctrine has both practical and theo-
retical challenges that urge caution before incorporating the doctrine into 
IP law. Numerous scholars have made persuasive cases for rejecting the 
doctrine. Their criticisms have ranged from the historical lack of a basis 
to differentiate such speech under the Constitution, to the challenges of 
distinguishing the commercial from the noncommercial, to the lack of a 
compelling normative account for why we should disfavor such 
 
ed States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 409–10 (2001) (noting controversy over the 
commercial speech doctrine and striking down federal assessment to promote mushroom 
sales); Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 255–56 (2010) (Thomas, 
J., concurring) (criticizing commercial speech distinction); Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 
654, 676–77 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (contending that Nike’s 
mixed commercial and noncommercial speech deserved heightened scrutiny and “breathing 
space,” and suggesting that only advertising with no other public interest value should be 
subject to lesser scrutiny in context of false advertising laws); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reil-
ly, 533 U.S. 525, 571–72 (2001) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (criticizing Central Hudson for 
providing “insufficient protection to truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech”); id. at 572 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (contending that truthful speech should be subject to strict scrutiny 
regardless of whether it is “characterized as ‘commercial’”); see also infra notes 188–90. 
188 See supra notes 8, 187; see also Darrel C. Menthe, The Marketplace Metaphor and 
Commercial Speech Doctrine: Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying About and Love Citizens 
United, 38 Hastings Const. L.Q. 131, 134 (2010) (arguing that “Citizens United will neces-
sarily lead to the abandonment of commercial speech doctrine”); Jedediah Purdy, Neoliberal 
Constitutionalism: Lochnerism for a New Economy, 77 Law & Contemp. Probs. 195, 200 
(2014) (observing the Supreme Court’s shift to treat commercial speech “as strongly protect-
ed”); Sullivan, supra note 163, at 145–61 (suggesting that the Court is moving away from 
distinctions based on commercial speech); William Van Alstyne, Remembering Melville 
Nimmer: Some Cautionary Notes on Commercial Speech, 43 UCLA L. Rev. 1635, 1638 
(1996) (“We have been receiving strong signals that perhaps [commercial speech] is some-
times even fully as much within the [First] Amendment as any other kind of speech may be—
including speech on political affairs.”). 
189 131 S. Ct. at 2663–64 (citation omitted) (holding restriction on sale, disclosure, and use 
of pharmacy records that reveal doctors’ prescribing practices unconstitutional); see also id. 
at 2673–85 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (claiming that the majority applied heightened scrutiny, 
rather than the intermediate scrutiny standard of Central Hudson). 
190 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); Citizens United v. 
FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); see also supra note 188.  
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speech.191 Other scholars have argued with equal passion for the oppo-
site—that commercial speech is less valuable, does not further First 
Amendment values (such as the search for truth or personhood inter-
ests), has historically been subject either to no or to lesser First Amend-
ment review, and is more resilient and therefore less prone to a chilling 
effect.192 I cannot settle these highly contested questions here. Neverthe-
less, because IP law does not require the doctrine’s importation to be 
constitutional, it is worth considering not only any potential benefits the 
doctrine might bring to IP laws, but also the burdens that come with it. 
Courts deciding IP cases routinely struggle with categorizing speech 
as commercial or noncommercial.193 Even though at its extremes com-
mercial speech can be easily assessed, the in-between space causes un-
certainty and confusion. Particularly challenging distinctions often arise 
in IP cases because such cases frequently sit at the nexus of art, politics, 
 
191 See, e.g., Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, The Anti-History and Pre-History of Com-
mercial Speech, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 747 (1993); Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid 
of Commercial Speech?, 76 Va. L. Rev. 627 (1990) [hereinafter Kozinski & Banner, Who’s 
Afraid of Commercial Speech?]; Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment in the Market-
place: Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 429 
(1971); Daniel E. Troy, Advertising: Not “Low Value Speech,” 16 Yale J. on Reg. 85 
(1999). 
192 See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 
62 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 3 (1976) (claiming that commercial speech deserves no speech protec-
tions because under his view it does not fit within a liberty-based or self-realization model of 
the First Amendment); Thomas H. Jackson & John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: 
Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 Va. L. Rev. 1, 5–6 (1979) (contending 
that commercial speech is not protected by the First Amendment because it does not further 
self-government or self-realization); Frederick Schauer, Commercial Speech and the Archi-
tecture of the First Amendment, 56 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1181, 1185–94 (1988) (contending that 
despite challenges commercial speech is far from core of First Amendment and claiming that 
its equal protection would lead to “doctrinal dilution”).  
193 Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that 
the “boundary between commercial and noncommercial speech has yet to be clearly deline-
ated”); see also Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 764–
65 (1976) (discussing idea that an advertisement, though commercial, may be of general 
public interest and giving examples); Sonia K. Katyal, Trademark Intersectionality, 57 
UCLA L. Rev. 1601, 1649–55 (2010) (noting the definitional challenges of applying the 
commercial speech analysis to trademarks); Kozinski & Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commer-
cial Speech?, supra note 191, at 638–48; McGinnis, supra note 172, at 75–76; Steven 
Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a General Theory of 
the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1212 (1984) (criticizing efforts to distinguish 
commercial from noncommercial speech and the current justifications for differential treat-
ment, but nevertheless allowing for some differential treatment of commercial speech). But 
see Schauer, supra note 192, at 1188–89 (recognizing the line-drawing arguments, but con-
tending that it provides an insufficient reason to reject the commercial speech doctrine). 
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news, and commerce. Advertising for consumer products, like a televi-
sion commercial for soap, is commercial speech—a novel is not, even if 
it is sold for profit. More difficult questions arise, however, when there 
is advertising for noncommercial products, such as for newspapers, tele-
vision series, or movies,194 or when there is mixed-purpose speech with 
both commercial and noncommercial elements.195 We tend to think of 
movies as being distinct from commercial speech, but it is hard to main-
tain a clear dividing line when many movies are expressly made to sell 
products, such as The Lego Movie.196 Titles of expressive works (such as 
songs, movies, and books) and advertising for such works also have 
proved particularly challenging for courts to categorize as commercial or 
noncommercial speech.197 
Advertising, corporate speech, cultural identities, and politics often 
combine in the context of trademarks.198 Consumers literally wear their 
 
194 Compare Friedan v. Friedan, 414 F. Supp. 77, 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (holding that adver-
tisement for a magazine enjoys the same First Amendment privilege as the underlying work), 
and Fortres Grand Corp. v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 947 F. Supp. 2d 922, 933–34 (N.D. 
Ind. 2013) (holding that promotion of motion picture is not commercial speech), with 
Charles v. City of Los Angeles, 697 F.3d 1146, 1151–52 (9th Cir. 2012) (categorizing adver-
tisement for television show as commercial speech), and Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 
F.3d 1007, 1017–18 (3d Cir. 2008) (categorizing making-of documentary for videogame as 
commercial speech), and Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 
727, 732–35 (D. Minn. 1998) (holding that movie title is commercial speech). 
195 See, e.g., Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 544 (1980) (holding 
that insert in utility company’s bill was fully protected); Dex Media W., Inc. v. City of Seat-
tle, 696 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that yellow pages are mixed speech deserving of 
full protection); Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 258–70 (Cal. 2002) (holding that mixed-
purpose statements about shoe company’s labor policies and practices were commercial 
speech); Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 676–80 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting from deni-
al of certiorari) (contending that very same mixed speech was noncommercial); see also Jon-
athan D. Varat, Deception and the First Amendment: A Central, Complex, and Somewhat 
Curious Relationship, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1107, 1130–31 (2006) (criticizing the First Amend-
ment treatment of mixed purpose speech in Kasky v. Nike, Inc., and pointing out that “[f]rom 
the beginning the commercial speech doctrine has threatened to unravel free speech theory”).  
196 The Lego Movie (Warner Bros. 2014). Hasbro, the toy company, has also jumped into 
the movie game as a way to market its games. Ryan Faughnder, Hasbro Makes Its Move into 
Movies, L.A. Times, Oct. 21, 2014, at B1. 
197 Compare Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 997–1001 (2d Cir. 1989) (concluding that 
title of movie is not commercial speech), with Am. Dairy Queen Corp., 35 F. Supp. 2d at 
732–35 (holding that movie title is commercial speech). 
198 See Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Policing the Border Between Trademarks and Free 
Speech: Protecting Unauthorized Trademark Use in Expressive Works, 80 Wash. L. Rev. 
887, 887–94, 933–40 (2005) (noting the challenge of distinguishing the commercial from the 
noncommercial in the context of trademark law); Katyal, supra note 193, at 1604–08, 1616–
22, 1641–44 (discussing the intersection of the marketplace of goods and the marketplace of 
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politics on their sleeves. People wear logos and buy particular brands 
because of what those trademarks symbolize, and companies specifically 
seek to develop such social and political overlays onto their brands.199 
Wearing American Apparel’s LEGALIZE GAY t-shirts may signal that one 
supports fair labor practices, domestic businesses, marriage equality, or 
all three. Wearing Gap’s (RED) line of clothing or Ralph Lauren’s PINK 
PONY line may signal support for “eliminat[ing] AIDS in Africa” or 
fighting breast cancer.200 These culturally and politically infused mes-
sages can be protected as trademarks and raise both infringement and di-
lution disputes when others use similar marks or slogans. HER brand 
energy drinks, for example, has tried to prevent other companies from 
using the color pink in drinks targeted at female consumers.201 The Uni-
versity of North Dakota threatened to sue one of its students to prevent 
him and other students from using the school’s trademarked logo when 
the student’s use was motivated by an objection to the school’s use of a 
Native American tribe as its team name and mascot.202 In such instances, 
courts cannot separate the commercial from the noncommercial when 
evaluating the scope of trademark law. 
In right of publicity cases, courts have also struggled to define what 
constitutes commercial speech or a commercial use under various state 
 
ideas, and the difficulties of neatly classifying trademarks as commercial speech given their 
expressive characteristics); Ramsey, supra note 17, at 397–402 (noting the challenge of dis-
tinguishing the commercial from the noncommercial in the context of trademark law); cf. 
Deven R. Desai, Speech, Citizenry, and the Market: A Corporate Public Figure Doctrine, 98 
Minn. L. Rev. 455 (2013) (describing the convergence of the corporate and the political).  
199 Beth Harben & Soyoung Kim, Political Opinion Leadership and Advertisement Atti-
tude: The Moderating Roles of Cognitive and Affective Responses to Political Messages, 47 
Soc. Sci. J. 90, 90–93 (2010) (describing “advocacy advertising,” sometimes also called 
“cause-branding”); Derek Thompson, Turning Customers into Cultists, The Atlantic, Dec. 
2014, at 26–32, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/12/turning-
customers-into-cultists/382248. 
200 See Press Release, Gap, Gap Introduces Inspirational Marketing Campaign (Oct. 3, 2007), 
available at http:// http://www.gapinc.com/content/gapinc/html/media/pressrelease/2007/med_
pr_REDmarketing100307.html; Ralph Lauren’s Philanthropic Initiatives, Pink Pony Fund, 
http://global.ralphlauren.com/en-us/About/Philanthropy/Pages/pink_pony.aspx?utm_source=re
direct&utm_medium=redirect&utm_campaign=PinkPony_redirect (last visited June 18, 2015). 
201 Complaint at 3, 7, 9–10, HER Enters. v. Nor-Cal Beverage Co., No. 12–03239 (C.D. 
Cal. Apr. 12, 2013) (stating that HER brand energy drink claimed Go Girl energy drink in-
fringed its mark by adopting similar pink trade dress in effort to appeal to women).  
202 Katyal, supra note 193, at 1685–86 (describing the University of North Dakota’s threats 
to sue one of its students for using the Fighting Sioux logo on gold pins with a slash through 
the logo to indicate his opposition to the use of the Native American tribe as the school mas-
cot).  
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laws. For example, a court in Illinois allowed a right of publicity claim 
to proceed against a publisher of a magazine for printing the plaintiffs’ 
photographs as winners of a contest in its media kit because the use was 
for a “commercial purpose” under Illinois law, even though the underly-
ing use in the magazine was not.203 In contrast, the Colorado Supreme 
Court held that the use of a plaintiff’s identity in a newsletter put out by 
a private investigation firm to solicit business was protected noncom-
mercial speech because it involved “legitimate matter[s] of public con-
cern.”204 
This disarray should come as no surprise to anyone following com-
mercial speech jurisprudence outside IP. Nevertheless, this lack of clari-
ty and predictability about what constitutes commercial speech disrupts 
the coherence of IP law. Given the increasing respect for commercial 
speech by the Supreme Court and the challenges presented by applying 
the doctrine to IP law, it is worth considering what IP law would look 
like in the absence of distinctions based on the doctrine. 
3. Failure to Conform to the Boundaries of Commercial Speech 
Even if it were feasible and appropriate to use commercial speech as a 
dividing line in IP cases, the disfavored uses would need to be limited to 
those that are actually commercial speech. No area of IP law, however, 
has actually so limited itself. As discussed, the Lanham Act, the right of 
publicity, and copyright laws are often applied beyond the limits of 
commercial speech. Conformity with the boundaries of commercial 
speech would therefore require substantial changes, especially to right of 
publicity and copyright law (though no one would ever contemplate 
such a radical alteration of copyright law). Even in trademark law the ar-
ray of precedents that would need to be overturned is substantial. Before 
considering such a change there should be a robust normative justifica-
tion for doing so. Are restrictions on speech in the context of IP disputes 
less concerning in the commercial speech context? Are the harms to IP 
holders greater when their property is used in commercial speech? I will 
consider both these questions in the remainder of this Part. 
 
203 Trannel v. Prairie Ridge Media, 987 N.E.2d 923, 929–30 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013). 
204 Joe Dickerson & Assocs., LLC v. Dittmar, 34 P.3d 995, 1002–03 (Colo. 2001).  
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B. A Proxy for Value and Free Speech Concerns 
Although not strictly driven by constitutionality, free speech concerns 
have animated a disfavoring of commercial uses because of an assess-
ment that commercial uses, particularly in the context of commercial 
speech, are less valuable. Such assessments often arise when evaluating 
free-speech-focused defenses, whether through an independent First 
Amendment defense or defenses internal to various IP laws (for exam-
ple, the fair use defense in copyright). When speech is judged less valu-
able, courts are less concerned with speech restrictions.205 
One reason some courts have given for disfavoring commercial 
speech is a misguided dichotomy between communicative, expressive 
speech and pure commercial speech—the latter being erroneously 
viewed as devoid of informational or expressive content. Some courts 
have suggested that the Lanham Act never applies to the “use of the 
mark by another who is communicating ideas or expressing points of 
view” and therefore must apply only to commercial speech.206 In Rogers 
v. Grimaldi, the Second Circuit concluded that expressive works deserve 
greater First Amendment protection “than the labeling of ordinary com-
mercial products.”207 Even though the court thought it was important to 
include noncommercial speech within the Lanham Act’s purview, the 
court nevertheless suggested a differential standard of First Amendment 
review when trademark law applies to noncommercial speech (or at least 
noncommercial speech deemed “artistic” in nature).208 The Rogers test 
limits trademark liability when a use is artistically relevant and not ex-
 
205 See Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of Low-Value Speech, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 2166 
(2015) (describing this phenomenon and questioning the claim that such a distinction is part 
of an original understanding of the First Amendment). There is a dispute over whether First 
Amendment analysis is a simple on-off switch or whether a balancing test is appropriate to 
determine whether restrictions on speech are constitutional. Although there are arguments 
for the on-off switch, most courts engage in some form of balancing of interests, especially 
when property interests, including IP interests, are at stake. See, e.g., Cardtoons, L.C. v. Ma-
jor League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 970–76 (10th Cir. 1996); see also Shiffrin, 
supra note 193, at 1251–55 (explaining why balancing of interests with the First Amendment 
is the dominant model).  
206 L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 29 (1st Cir. 1987); HER, Inc. v. 
RE/MAX First Choice, LLC, 468 F. Supp. 2d 964, 967 (S.D. Ohio 2007).  
207 Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 998–99 (2d Cir. 1989).  
208 Id. 
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plicitly misleading. The test has been widely adopted,209 but has been 
limited to noncommercial and expressive speech.210 
This view of commercial speech (as being speech that lacks expres-
sive or informative components) is out of step with the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence.211 One of the primary reasons the Supreme Court has giv-
en for protecting commercial speech is the information value of such 
speech.212 One of the main justifications for the First Amendment is the 
promotion of the marketplace of ideas and its facilitation of the search 
for truth; commercial speech contributes to such truth seeking.213 The 
fact that something appears in advertising for a product (the narrowest 
meaning of “commercial speech”) does not indicate that the use is not 
valuable, informative, or expressive. Consider the Goldie Blox commer-
cial discussed in the Introduction. The message of female empowerment 
and the critique of stereotypical girls’ toys have the same import and 
power regardless of the company’s additional interest in selling toys. 
The fact that the company seeks to turn a profit does not disrupt the po-
litical and cultural goals upon which the company was founded—
encouraging more women to go into engineering and science.214 The ad-
vertisement has been applauded as an important intervention in the high-
ly gendered world of children’s toys, as well as an appropriate parody 
and commentary on the original, misogynistic Beastie Boys’ song.215 
The use is as disruptive, influential, artistic, and political in the context 
 
209 See, e.g., Brown v. Elec. Arts, 724 F.3d 1235, 1239, 1241–42 (9th Cir. 2013); Univ. of 
Ala. Bd. of Trs. v. New Life Art, Inc., 683 F.3d 1266, 1277–79 (11th Cir. 2012); ETW Corp. 
v. Jireh Publ’g,  Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 927–28 (6th Cir. 2003). 
210 See Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1018 (3d Cir. 2008) (declining to 
reach the issue of whether to adopt the Rogers test because the speech at issue was commer-
cial speech); cf. Fortres Grand Corp. v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 947 F. Supp. 2d 922, 933–
934 (N.D. Ind. 2013) (accepting proposition that Rogers test is limited to noncommercial 
speech, but applying the test to promotional websites that it concluded were not commercial 
speech).  
211 Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2671–72 (2011); Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. 
Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762–69 (1976). 
212 Va. Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763 (“As to the particular consumer’s interest in the 
free flow of commercial information, that interest may be as keen, if not keener by far, than 
his interest in the day’s most urgent political debate.”). 
213 See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2671–72; Va. Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762–69; Abrams 
v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630–31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Thomas I. Emerson, 
The System of Freedom of Expression 6–7 (1970).  
214 About, Goldie Blox, http://www.goldieblox.com/pages/about, archived at 
http://perma.cc/48V2-DCEB (last visited June 18, 2015).  
215 See Waldman, supra note 6. 
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of an advertisement as it would be as an independent film short. In fact, 
it may well be more influential because of the wider audience likely to 
be reached by the advertisement (and the associated toys). 
Even the most clear-cut example of commercial speech—such as 
“buy COLGATE fluoride toothpaste”—communicates ideas. Not only 
does it tell consumers to “buy this toothpaste” instead of another, but 
such advertisements also often provide useful information (both explicit-
ly and implicitly), such as that fluoride is good for your teeth or that 
doctors recommend you use a fluoride toothpaste. If what is really at is-
sue is a concern about informational content, commerciality is not a 
good proxy. 
The use of public (and private) figures’ identities in advertising also 
provides informational value. Consumers care about and find useful in-
formation about what products celebrities use, whether it is what facial 
cream Scarlett Johansson uses, or what watch deep-sea divers like James 
Cameron wear. We may choose to prevent even nonconfusing uses of 
Johansson’s and Cameron’s names or images in advertisements for skin-
care products or timepieces, but we cannot claim that we are doing so 
because such uses do not provide valuable information to consumers. 
Moreover, to the extent that we read value more broadly than simply 
the provision of information and ideas, personhood interests also come 
into play. Another frequently posited justification for the First Amend-
ment is the promotion of individual liberty interests.216 In fact it is on 
this basis that opponents of treating commercial speech equally under 
the First Amendment make their strongest arguments—corporations do 
not have personhood interests, so commercial speech does not fit within 
the protections of the First Amendment.217 Despite this claim, corporate 
speakers and the audience for such commercial speech do have person-
 
216 Sometimes this individual-oriented view of the First Amendment focuses on autonomy 
and the constitutional hook of liberty, at others on self-expression, self-realization, self-
development or self-fulfillment. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Human Liberty & Freedom of 
Speech 3–5, 47–69 (1989) (developing a liberty-based theory); Emerson, supra note 213, at 6 
(including “assuring individual self-fulfillment” as one of the four primary values of the First 
Amendment); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 591 (1982) 
(positing “self-realization” as the primary value served by free speech and observing that it is 
fundamental even within the democratic-society approach); see also Whitney v. California, 
274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“[F]reedom to think as you will and to 
speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political 
truth . . . .”).  
217 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 192, at 5–25, 56; Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 192, at 5–6, 
14–17.  
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hood interests. Recent decisions like Citizens United and Hobby Lobby 
emphasize that corporations are treated as persons for First Amendment 
and other purposes and that (closely held) corporations may reflect par-
ticular views of their owners.218 Goldie Blox toys are a good example of 
this mixed motivation and the company itself is imbued with the person-
hood interests of its founder. The founder, Debbie Sterling, is a female 
engineer who specifically started the company not only to make money, 
but also to “inspire the next generation of female engineers.”219 She has 
a personhood interest in advertising the toys and using the advertise-
ments to intervene in gendered stereotypes about toys and narrow vi-
sions of femininity perpetuated by the likes of the Beastie Boys. The 
audience’s personhood interests are also furthered by receiving the 
commentary provided by Goldie Blox.220  
Even when uses are not commercial speech, courts sometimes deem 
them “commercial” to indicate that the speech is of lesser value. This is 
particularly true in right of publicity cases that involve merchandise. The 
California Supreme Court in Comedy III Productions v. Gary Saderup, 
Inc., distinguished Andy Warhol’s paintings and prints of celebrities 
from those of the defendant Gary Saderup. Warhol’s work was viewed 
as commenting on the nature of celebrity itself.221 In contrast, Saderup’s 
lithograph of the Three Stooges was determined to be primarily focused 
on moneymaking. “[T]he marketability and economic value of the chal-
lenged work derive[s] primarily from the fame of the celebrity depict-
ed . . . .”222 Although the Court denies that its evaluation requires a de-
termination of the quality of the artistic work, such an evaluation seems 
 
218 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2767–75, 2785 (2014) (al-
lowing closely held for-profit corporations to assert religious-liberty protections under the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 350–56 (2010) 
(holding that First Amendment protects corporate political speech); see also supra note 188. 
219 See Debbie Sterling, Biography, Engineer Girl, http://www.engineergirl.org/Engineers/
Directory/13512.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/3JQX-JNJ5 (last visited June 18, 2015). 
220 The turn to greater protection for commercial speech largely has been rooted in such 
consumer/recipient interests. See, e.g., Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer 
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762–63 (1976); see also Adam Winkler, Public Citizens United, in 
We the Corporations (forthcoming, chapter manuscript on file with author) (describing how 
an interest in protecting consumer rights rooted in the rights of recipients evolved into great-
er protections for corporate speech).  
221 Comedy III Prods. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 811 (Cal. 2001).  
222 Id. at 810–11.  
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unavoidable.223 Such determinations, however, are highly fraught. When 
forced to make such determinations, courts often fall back on problemat-
ic proxies for artistic merit, such as (ironically) the commercial success 
and fame of the artist.224 
In the context of copyright’s express exemptions for preferred catego-
ries of uses, many turn on the noncommerciality of the uses. For exam-
ple, copyright law places nonprofit libraries and archives in a special 
category because of their value in preserving works for posterity and fa-
cilitating access to knowledge. These objectives, however, could be fur-
thered by commercial or noncommercial entities. Consider the recent ef-
fort by Google to digitize books purportedly for archival and research 
purposes. Such a massive digital library would have enormous positive 
public value, even if Google is at least partially motivated by financial 
gain. An interest in financial gain does not preclude the possibility of 
other motives—Google can have both an interest in making money and 
in improving access to knowledge and preserving our collective history. 
Accordingly, Google’s for-profit status should not be the key to deter-
mining whether such a project falls within a fair use or a Section 108-
like exemption. There may nevertheless be a variety of concerns with 
allowing a single private entity to monopolize digitization efforts, but 
these concerns do not turn solely on Google’s for-profit status. Moreo-
ver, the law could prevent the lockup effect in a variety of other ways, 
from banning such monopolies to funding alternatives, or requiring free 
access to the public in order to benefit from any exemptions.225 
Simply put, determinations of value do not provide a sufficient basis 
for distinguishing commercial and noncommercial speech, nor for-profit 
or not-for-profit uses in IP. 
 
223 See Rebecca Tushnet, A Mask That Eats into the Face: Images and the Right of Pub-
licity, 38 Colum. J.L. & Arts 157, 168–74 (2015) [hereinafter Tushnet, Mask]; cf. Andrew 
Gilden & Timothy Greene, Fair Use for the Rich & Fabulous?, 80 U. Chi. L. Rev. Dialogue 
88 (2013) (contending that courts provide more favorable treatment to well-known artists in 
fair use determinations); Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of Copy-
right, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 683 (2012) (considering the challenges courts face when evaluating 
images in copyright cases and the unavoidable artistic judgments required to do so). 
224 See, e.g., Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 709 (2d Cir. 2013) (noting celebrity attendees 
to defendant’s art shows in context of evaluating whether artist’s work was a fair use of a 
less well-known (but still professional) photographer); see also supra note 223. 
225 For a discussion of some of the dangers of giving a monopoly to Google, see generally 
Pamela Samuelson, Google Book Search and the Future of Books in Cyberspace, 94 Minn. 
L. Rev. 1308 (2010). 
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C. Proxy for Harm 
Another frequent basis for considering commerciality is the belief that 
the commercial status of a work will reveal the likelihood that it will 
harm an owner. The use of commerciality as a proxy for harm has pri-
marily revolved around the definition of “commercial” as a use for profit 
(in the sense of seeking financial gain). Commerciality is used as a 
proxy for determining the likelihood of various injuries, from economic 
to dignitary harms, as well as the likelihood of confusion and dilution in 
the context of trademark law. I will consider the value of commerciality 
as a proxy for each of these harms, and also—when relevant—consider 
whether commercial speech (at its narrowest, in the sense of advertising 
for products or services) functions as a useful proxy for such harms. 
1. Market Harm 
All IP laws to some extent concern themselves with the actual or po-
tential harm to an IP creator’s or owner’s market. This focus derives not 
only from concerns over direct harm, but also from a broader interest in 
incentivizing creation. This motivation is front and center in copyright 
law, in which the dominant (though not exclusive) justification for copy-
right is an incentive-based rationale. Copyright allows creators to har-
ness the economic value of their works which otherwise could be easily 
copied and distributed to others, given their nonrivalrous nature. This in-
centive rubric has also been asserted as one of the justifications for right 
of publicity and trademark laws. Although the case for incentivizing the 
development of a robust public persona is weaker than that for incentiv-
izing works in the copyright context, courts frequently assert as one of 
the justifications for right of publicity laws encouraging individuals 
(particularly actors or other performers) to develop their careers.226 
Trademark laws do not seek to incentivize the production of more or 
better trademarks, but they do seek to encourage businesses to invest in 
high-quality and consistent goods.227 
 
226 See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573–77 (1977). For 
criticisms of this rationale, see Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular 
Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 Calif. L. Rev. 125, 206–28 (1993); Jennifer E. Rothman, 
Copyright Preemption and the Right of Publicity, 36 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 199, 245 n.218, 
246–48 (2002).  
227 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspec-
tive, 30 J.L. & Econ. 265, 270 (1987).  
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In the context of copyright’s fair use defense, there is a presumption 
that a commercial use is one that will cause market harm by substituting 
for the original in the marketplace. The House Report to the 1976 Copy-
right Act justified using the commercial nature of a use as a “significant 
factor” in fair use analysis because the “[c]opying by a profit-making 
user of even a small portion of a [work] may have a significant impact 
on the commercial market for the work.”228 Thus, although commerciali-
ty is listed as a factor-one inquiry (in the multifactor fair use analysis) 
related to the character and purpose of the use, it is justified primarily 
because of a presumption of market harm—the factor-four considera-
tion.229 
Damage to the market for a copyrighted work is a relevant inquiry in 
fair use, but market harm can be directly evaluated and need not rely on 
a proxy-based determination like commerciality. Moreover, commercial-
ity has limited value as a proxy for harm. While some commercial uses 
are substitutionary—such as identical copies flooded into the same mar-
kets—others, such as transformative reworkings that do not compete in 
the same arena, usually are not. A substitutionary effect is also possible 
and sometimes likely when a noncommercial, not-for-profit use is made. 
If an individual posts a movie on a tube site or allows access for upload-
ing as part of a BitTorrent swarm, a substitutionary product has been 
posted or made available that will interfere with both box office and 
home video sales. The fact that the distributor seeks no financial gain 
does not make the posting or uploading less harmful to the underlying 
content holder. Such a posting would not succeed with a fair use de-
fense—despite being noncommercial; however, my point here is not to 
evaluate individual fair use claims, but instead to hone in on the possible 
justifications for distinguishing between commercial and noncommercial 
uses when making such evaluations. 
The use of commerciality as a proxy for market harm may have de-
rived in part from an earlier time when large-scale noncommercial uses 
were not widespread and were technologically more difficult (and ex-
pensive). Today, however, noncommercial uses can easily harm markets 
and substitute for original and derivative works.230 Consider the Sony 
 
228 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 74 (1976).  
229 See Beebe, supra note 70, at 599. 
230 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 920–23 
(2005) (describing peer-to-peer file-sharing programs in which ninety percent of content ex-
changed was copyrighted, often music files that could substitute for sales). 
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Betamax decision that held fair the sale of home video recorders that 
were sometimes used to record broadcast television for later viewing. 
The Supreme Court suggested that the time-shifting uses would not have 
been fair if they were commercial—largely because if they were, then 
there was a predicted market harm that would flow from these commer-
cial uses.231 Even though market harm was unlikely at the time—from 
the private and personal time shifting facilitated by the recorders—today 
there would be commercial harm from such time-shifting. At the time of 
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., there was no al-
ternative method for consumers to watch shows that they could not view 
at the broadcast time, whereas today a major business model for televi-
sion shows is online streaming or digital or DVD purchases. The fact 
that consumer time shifting is not commercial does not alter the reality 
that such time shifting now interferes with market revenues.232 
Nonprofit educational uses can also damage markets for works. Con-
sider the recent decision in Cambridge University Press v. Patton.233 
The Eleventh Circuit observed that copying by academic institutions of 
copyrighted works for use in electronic course reserves or e-packets can 
cause significant market harm.234 Such educational uses could destroy 
the market for academic publishing just as much as commercial uses 
would; in fact, education markets are often the primary market for these 
works.235 
Similarly, in the context of the right of publicity, a noncommercial 
use does not make economic harms less likely. Even though it is true 
that uses of a person’s identity in a commercial context can damage the 
market for licensing that person’s identity and can damage the person’s 
ability to earn a living in her main profession if the use reflects poorly 
upon her, such ill effects could easily occur in the aftermath of a non-
commercial (as in not-for-profit) use. Whether commercial or not, third-
party uses can cause overexposure and tarnishing associations. 
Consider the recent lawsuits filed by Cindy Lee Garcia objecting to 
the use of her image and performance in the controversial movie The In-
nocence of Muslims—which sparked violent protests in the Middle East. 
 
231 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442, 449 (1984). 
232 Such time shifting may still be fair use, but for reasons other than an absence of market 
harm, such as considerations of privacy and personal use. 
233 769 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2014). 
234 Id. at 1275.  
235 See id. at 1275–79.  
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Garcia alleges that she was told the film was about an entirely different 
subject and was given misleading script pages. She alleges that she 
would not have agreed to appear in the film if she had known what it 
was about. Garcia sued the filmmakers for right of publicity and copy-
right violations.236 My focus here is on her right of publicity claim. As a 
result of the use of her identity, she suffered emotional distress and myr-
iad economic damages, including the loss of her job.237 If she had been a 
more successful actor, the use of her identity in the film no doubt would 
have negatively affected her future ability to get roles and the willing-
ness of anyone to pay for her to endorse a product or service. The use of 
her identity in the film unquestionably sits outside commercial speech 
yet still caused substantial economic harm. Arguably, the movie is non-
commercial in the broader sense of not being for profit, since the film’s 
primary motivation allegedly was to criticize Islam and it does not seem 
that there was any effort to make money from the film’s distribution.238 
Nevertheless, the economic harm to Ms. Garcia is the same regardless of 
whether it is commercial speech, a commercial use, or (as in this case) 
neither. 
The fact that right of publicity cases tend to disfavor merchandising 
may in part reflect similar concerns about market harm. Eugene Volokh 
has convincingly pointed to the First Amendment problems that the right 
of publicity faces by disfavoring merchandise as if it were commercial 
speech, when it is not.239 Merchandising is often not commercial speech, 
even if it is commercial in the sense of being sold for profit. The concern 
over market harm has particular salience in a context in which an identi-
ty-holder might wish to market her own merchandise. In that instance a 
substitutionary problem arises in a way that it does not in the case of a 
single work of art. This difference may explain why many state right of 
 
236 Garcia also sued YouTube (owned by Google) for secondary liability for copyright in-
fringement for the posting of the video on its website. The copyright issue was recently de-
cided by the Ninth Circuit in Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 740–44, 747 (9th Cir. 
2015) (en banc) (holding that plaintiff was not likely to succeed on her claim that her per-
formance in the film was copyrightable). 
237 See Complaint at 4, 9, 12, Garcia v. Nakoula, No. BC 492358 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Sept. 19, 2012).  
238 See Answer at 1–2, Garcia v. Nakoula, No. CV12-8315-MWF (C.D. Cal. May 20, 
2014) (noting that the defendant director had not distributed the video and that he had based 
the work on his research on Islam).  
239 Volokh, supra note 81, at 908–11. 
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publicity statutes exempt works of art that are single and original works, 
but not multiple copies of those works.240 
But this disfavoring of merchandise cannot be supported on the basis 
of commerciality. An Andy Warhol painting of Marilyn Monroe may be 
expressive, but it is still commercial—it was painted in part with an in-
terest in making money. Warhol originally sold his Orange Marilyn in 
1964 for $1,800, and in 1998 the painting sold for more than $17 mil-
lion.241 If this painting should be treated differently for liability or First 
Amendment purposes from mass-produced t-shirts of Marilyn Monroe 
with another artist’s painting of her on them, it cannot be on the basis 
that one is commercial and the other is not. They are both commercial. 
Instead, the difference is the greater likelihood that the use will injure 
the market for Marilyn Monroe (or her heirs) to sell official Marilyn 
Monroe merchandise because of the larger number of t-shirts sold and 
the greater likelihood that the Monroe estate would enter the t-shirt mar-
ketplace.242 Despite this possible distinction, I am not defending here ei-
ther postmortem publicity rights or a differential treatment for First 
Amendment purposes of the t-shirts versus the painting. Instead, I am 
highlighting that the difference in market harm does not stem from a dif-
ferent commercial status between the two works. Instead, as we saw in 
copyright law, commerciality is not a good proxy for market harm in the 
right of publicity context. 
 
240 See, e.g., Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 597.790(2)(e) (LexisNexis 2014); Wash. Rev. Code 
§ 63.60.070(2)(a) (2015).  
241 Richard Polsky, I Bought Andy Warhol 10–11 (2005) (describing Warhol’s interest in 
making money and the details of both sales). Warhol actually painted a series of Monroe 
paintings, making it more difficult to distinguish his work from t-shirts with Monroe’s image 
on them; see also Tushnet, Mask, supra note 223, at 169–70 (discussing how the California 
Supreme Court viewed Warhol’s silkscreens as transformative because of Warhol’s reputa-
tion).  
242 I use Monroe as an example because of Warhol’s work and reference to it in right of 
publicity decisions, but the status of her postmortem rights is contested. See Milton H. 
Greene Archives, Inc. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc., 692 F.3d 983, 1000 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding 
that Monroe had no postmortem rights, at least under California law, because she died domi-
ciled in New York State, which does not recognize a postmortem right of publicity). Her es-
tate is currently seeking to add a postmortem right in New York that would resurrect her 
right. See S. No. 5650 (N.Y. 2015) (proposing a postmortem right of publicity in the state). 
States that do not require a person to have died as a domicile may also recognize Monroe’s 
postmortem rights. See Experience Hendrix L.L.C. v. Hendrixlicensing.com LTD, 762 F.3d 
829, 835–37 (9th Cir. 2014) (allowing Jimi Hendrix’s heirs to proceed with suit under Wash-
ington State’s postmortem right of publicity law even though Hendrix died domiciled in 
New York).  
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In the context of trademark law, jurisdictional requirements of a 
commercial use or a use in connection with the sale of goods or services 
or other commercial activities have been interpreted in a variety of 
ways.243 There has been no particular articulation, other than the limits 
of the Commerce Clause, for why we would want to so limit trademark 
infringement actions. It is possible that there is a presumption that for-
profit uses are more likely to cause market harm. This is more possible 
in the context of trademarks than those of copyright or right of publicity 
laws. One can imagine that if Mutual of Omaha sells insurance and Mu-
tual of Topeka starts its own insurance company, then consumers (if 
confused about the connection between the two) might purchase 
MUTUAL OF TOPEKA insurance instead of MUTUAL OF OMAHA insurance, 
thus causing market harm to the senior mark user. 
Market harm might also be produced, however, by noncommercial 
uses that are critical—such as the infamous (at least in trademark cir-
cles) MUTANT OF OMAHA t-shirts and other merchandise that comment 
on the absurdity of buying insurance to protect against a nuclear holo-
caust.244 The defendant in that case did sell his wares—though not insur-
ance. Even so, the defendant Franklyn Novak unquestionably had a “po-
litical message” in addition to an interest in profit-making. Moreover, 
the alleged harm would have been the same if he had given the mer-
chandise away for free without any interest in financial gain. If Novak’s 
variation on the MUTUAL OF OMAHA mark produces negative associa-
tions in consumers’ minds, it could discourage them from purchasing 
MUTUAL OF OMAHA insurance and cause market harm in that regard. 
At the same time, not all uses that are commercial and cause market 
harm are infringing (or diluting); only those that cause a likelihood of 
confusion (or dilution) are. If instead of “Mutual of Topeka” the compet-
ing insurance company names itself “Topeka Life Insurance,” it also 
may siphon off business from Mutual of Omaha—especially if its ad 
campaigns target the same market or compare its services and products. 
Yet this commercial market harm is not and should not be actionable 
under trademark law. What matters for establishing wrongdoing is a 
demonstration that such market harm was caused by unfair behavior—in 
particular by causing likely confusion or dilution among the relevant 
 
243 See discussion supra Section I.A. 
244 Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 399–403 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding that 
MUTANT OF OMAHA merchandise was likely to cause confusion and rejecting a First 
Amendment defense).  
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consumers. If a confusing or diluting use is a possible substitute in the 
marketplace this would indeed increase the potential market harm, but 
like the analysis for copyright law and the right of publicity, one can di-
rectly consider substitutionary effect without focusing on commerciality. 
I will next consider whether confusion and dilution are more likely in a 
commercial rather than a noncommercial context. 
2. Confusion and Dilution 
Trademark infringement and dilution actions turn on whether there is 
a likelihood of confusion (as to source or sponsorship) or a likelihood of 
dilution (by tarnishment or blurring). These inquiries are in part proxies 
for market harm, but they also provide a dividing line between what is 
fair and unfair competition. One can fairly compete in the marketplace 
and divert business, but one cannot do so by confusing and misleading 
the public. In the context of dilution, the dividing line is somewhat more 
muddy and controversial, but the claim is that if the use unduly waters 
down or tarnishes another’s mark then one has crossed the line and en-
gaged in unfair competition.245 Does commerciality affect the likelihood 
of confusion or dilution? 
Commerciality (either in the commercial speech sense or for-profit 
sense) does not seem to have much to do with whether a use is more or 
less likely to cause confusion or dilution. Nevertheless, the extent of 
harm that would follow in the wake of such confusion or dilution might 
differ at least if a substitute is available in the marketplace (which could 
be more likely if a product or service is sold). If one can purchase both 
COLGATE and COLGOAT toothpaste in the market and they have similar 
packaging, there is likely to be greater confusion. But this increased 
likelihood of confusion has more to do with how the use appears in the 
marketplace—a consideration in likelihood-of-confusion analyses—than 
with whether it is commercial.246 Suppose that the COLGOAT toothpaste 
is given away outside the supermarket by members of People for the 
Ethical Treatment of Animals (“PETA”) to protest Colgate’s continued 
use of animals for testing its products. Now we have a noncommercial 
use of the mark, yet confusion might still occur—particularly if the 
PETA distributors are not clearly identifying themselves as PETA or the 
 
245 See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
246 See, e.g., AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348–49 (9th Cir. 1979); Polaroid 
Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961). 
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product as different. Moreover, after the COLGOAT is handed out there 
might be some post-sale (or more accurately, post-distribution) confu-
sion that would not be ameliorated by the PETA messaging. The likely 
blurring and tarnishment of the COLGATE mark would be equally likely 
(or unlikely) to occur without regard to the commerciality of the use.  
Are there other reasons to think that uses in commercial speech are 
more likely to foment confusion? Most consumers are actually quite 
skeptical of commercial advertising.247 Some courts have even suggested 
that confusion is more likely in the noncommercial context, because 
communicative, noncommercial goods and services are free and there-
fore less heavily scrutinized. A district court in Virginia, for example, 
recently suggested that confusion was more likely when a nonprofit 
foundation criticized the NAACP (National Association for the Ad-
vancement of Colored People) by referring to it as the National Associa-
tion of Abortion for Colored People, rather than by its actual name, 
“[b]ecause the average consumer would not make a time or financial in-
vestment to access the [defendant’s] information services, [and] the con-
sumer is less likely to take care in investigating the author or sponsor of 
articles.”248 While marketing studies show that audiences are also skep-
tical of political and nonprofit advertising, there is little support for the 
proposition that people are more likely to be confused or deceived by 
commercial speech. 
Confusion caused by noncommercial speech can also be harmful. The 
Second Circuit emphasized this point in Rogers v. Grimaldi, in which it 
applied the Lanham Act to a movie title and pointed out that deception 
can be a problem regardless of whether a work is commercial speech.249 
The court explained: 
 
247 See, e.g., Carl Obermiller et al., Ad Skepticism: The Consequences of Disbelief, 34 J. 
Advertising 7 (2005) (noting that many consumers question “advertising claims” and 
“roughly two-thirds of consumers claim they doubt the truthfulness of ads”); Syeda Nazish 
Zehra Rizvi et al., Impact of Consumer Involvement on Advertising Skepticism: A Frame-
work to Reduce Advertising Skepticism, 4 Interdisc. J. Contemp. Res. Bus. 465, 465–66 
(2012) (surveying the literature on consumer skepticism and considering the effect of con-
sumer involvement on such skepticism).  
248 Radiance Found., Inc. v. NAACP, 25 F. Supp. 3d 865, 890 (E.D. Va. 2014), vacated on 
other grounds, 786 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2015). 
249 Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989). I note that the conclusion that a title is 
noncommercial speech is contested. See, e.g., Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods., 
Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727, 732–35 (D. Minn. 1998) (holding that movie title was commercial 
speech); see also supra note 197 and accompanying text.  
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 Movies, plays, books, and songs are all indisputably works of artis-
tic expression and deserve protection. Nonetheless, they are also sold 
in the commercial marketplace like other more utilitarian products, 
making the danger of consumer deception a legitimate concern that 
warrants some government regulation. Poetic license is not without 
limits. The purchaser of a book, like the purchaser of a can of peas, 
has a right not to be misled as to the source of the product.250  
Confusion also matters in the context of political speech, perhaps 
much more to our democracy and the public than confusion in the con-
text of commercial speech for consumer goods like toothpaste. Judge R. 
Gary Klausner of the Central District of California suggested that the 
Lanham Act should apply to campaign advertising for this very reason: 
“[The Lanham] Act’s purpose of reducing consumer confusion supports 
application of the Act to political speech, where the consequences of 
widespread confusion as to the source of such speech could be dire.”251  
Confusion in the commercial arena may be less problematic than con-
fusion about many noncommercial communications. If people mistaken-
ly buy 7-UP thinking it is made by Coca-Cola, when it is not, there is 
minimal harm to consumers from that deception. On the other hand, if 
someone votes for a President thinking that she was endorsed by Colin 
Powell or that she was a war veteran, when she is not, the stakes are 
much higher. Similarly, confusion over nonprofit organizations’ origins 
and sponsorship and deceptive advertising claims may be of the utmost 
concern to individuals and to the other organizations that compete both 
in the marketplace of ideas and for charitable donations. 
Members of Congress have recognized the ability of noncommercial 
speech and noncommercial (not-for-profit) uses to cause trademark and 
quasi-trademark injuries. Representative F. James Sensenbrenner Jr., in 
his comments on the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, testified 
that “there are those in both commercial and noncommercial settings 
who would seize upon the popularity of a trademark at the expense of 
the rightful owner and the public. . . . This conduct can debase the value 
of a famous mark and mislead the consuming public.”252 In the context 
of the anti-cybersquatting provision, Congress expressly rejected a pro-
 
250 Rogers, 875 F.2d at 997–98 (citations omitted). 
251 Browne v. McCain, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1079 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (citing United We 
Stand Am., Inc. v. United We Stand, Am. N.Y., Inc., 128 F.3d 86, 91–93 (2d Cir. 1997)). 
252 152 Cong. Rec. H6963 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 2006). 
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posed noncommercial use exemption because of concerns that this 
would create a “loophole that . . . might swallow the bill.”253 
To the extent that we wish to protect consumers from confusion and 
producers from unfair competition when there is likely deception or di-
lution, distinctions on the basis of commerciality do not track these con-
cerns. Current constitutional doctrine permits such distinctions, but we 
cannot pretend that such distinctions actually further the animating con-
cerns of trademark law. 
3. Dignitary/Reputational Harm 
In addition to protecting the economic interests of individuals, the 
right of publicity also protects dignitary and privacy-based interests.254 
In right of publicity cases there is sometimes an assumption that com-
mercial uses presumptively cause harm and that this harm is greater than 
in the context of noncommercial uses. Yet the case for this conclusion 
has not been made. Would Lady Gaga be more upset by the use of her 
name and image to sell a line of organic baby food, BABY GAGA, or on 
billboards put out by the Family Research Council (“FRC”) on “The Sin 
of Homosexual Marriage” that suggest that Lady Gaga has switched 
sides in the culture war? Lady Gaga would undoubtedly suffer greater 
injuries—both dignitary and financial—if the public erroneously thought 
she had abandoned her support of marriage equality and got on board 
with the FRC.255 In such an instance, the noncommercial use of her iden-
tity would be far more damaging than the commercial one, both as an 
economic and as a dignitary matter. The frequent outrage expressed by 
musicians when their music is used by politicians that support political 
views with which they disagree demonstrates exactly this.256 
 
253 H.R. Rep. No. 106-412, at 11 (1999). 
254 For a developed consideration of the different justifications for the right of publicity, 
including dignitary interests, see Rothman, supra note 226, at 202–08; Rothman, supra note 
84, at 204–24.  
255 Lady Gaga could also bring a defamation claim against the FRC under these circumstances. 
256 See, e.g., Henley v. DeVore, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1150–64 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (allow-
ing a copyright claim when musician’s songs were used in political advertisement); Browne, 
611 F. Supp. 2d at 1062, 1065–73 (allowing right of publicity claim for using recording art-
ist’s music in political ad); see also James C. McKinley Jr., G.O.P. Candidates Are Told, 
Don’t Use the Verses, It’s Not Your Song, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 2012, at C1, C7 (describing 
numerous musicians’ complaints against Republican candidates who used their music with-
out permission).  
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One recent example revolves around fan fiction involving boy-band 
heartthrob Harry Styles (from One Direction) that includes numerous 
explicit sex scenes with his “character.” The fictional work by Anna 
Todd was initially distributed and posted for free, though now it is being 
sold by a publisher.257 Mr. Styles may suffer a greater dignitary harm—
and economic one—if this fan fiction disrupts his carefully groomed 
wholesome image, than if an advertisement for a ROLEX watch showed 
him wearing one of the company’s watches.258 My point is not that the 
First Amendment should not protect the use of Styles’ name in Todd’s 
fiction, nor that sexualized portraits are more denigrating than watch-
wearing, but simply that commerciality can often be beside the point 
when evaluating whether dignitary and economic injuries have occurred 
or are likely to occur. 
Similar issues arise in the copyright context. To the extent that one 
takes a broader view of copyright law beyond a purely incentive-based, 
narrow utilitarian model—which I think one should—it is worth consid-
ering beyond economic injuries whether commercial uses of copyrighted 
works would have a significantly greater dignitary or reputational harm 
than noncommercial uses. Even though the use of a copyrighted work in 
commercial advertising and other commercial settings might raise digni-
tary concerns,259 it does not necessarily raise more concerns than in a 
noncommercial context. Jackson Browne, for example, alleged that he 
suffered a dignitary injury when his copyrighted music was used in a po-
litical campaign for a candidate with whom he disagreed.260 Other crea-
 
257 See Cady Drell, One Direction Fan Fiction Writer Gets Six-Figure Book Deal: Harry 
Styles Gets Erotic Fiction Treatment in Anna Todd’s Debut Novel, After, Rolling Stone (Oct. 
23, 2014), http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/news/one-direction-fan-fiction-writer-gets-six-
figure-book-deal-20141023, archived at http://perma.cc/56LG-ZYXP.  
258 See Rebecka Schumann, One Direction Fans Slam Harry Styles Fan Fiction Author 
Anna Todd, Int’l Bus. Times (Aug. 8, 2014, 12:03 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/one-
direction-fans-slam-harry-styles-fan-fiction-author-anna-todd-1653180 (quoting one fan who 
said, “Imagine how much it will ruin not only Harry’s, but One Direction’s image? Personal-
ly, I don’t want One Direction to be known as 5 abusive womanizes [sic] and . . . I’m sure 
you don’t too”).  
259 Numerous musicians have refused to license their work for use in advertising. See, e.g., 
Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 1992); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 
F.2d 460, 461 (9th Cir. 1988); R.J. Cubarrubia, Adam Yauch’s Will Prohibits Use of His 
Music in Ads, Rolling Stone (Aug. 9, 2012), http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/
adam-yauchs-will-prohibits-use-of-his-music-in-ads-20120809.  
260 Browne, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1131–32; see also Henley, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1144  (reject-
ing a fair use defense when a well-known musician’s songs were used in political advertise-
ment); supra note 256.  
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tors have complained about the perversion of their work in a variety of 
contexts that are not commercial speech or for-profit.261 
Undoubtedly, some identity-holders and authors think that the use of 
their identities or works in commercial advertising causes a greater dig-
nitary harm than other uses. One can recognize such views without hav-
ing the fact that a use is commercial speech determine whether econom-
ic or dignitary harms have occurred. Such sensitivities understandably 
may affect the amount of damages in the case, but it is less clear that 
they should be considerations for determining liability. 
D. Fairness and Unjust Enrichment 
Some of the focus on whether a use is commercial is driven by con-
cerns about unjust enrichment. This is the most convincing of the poten-
tial justifications for distinguishing commercial and noncommercial us-
es. This frame tracks—at least in part—the labor-reward justifications 
for copyright, right of publicity, and trademark laws. Authors, perform-
ers, and companies have all worked hard to create works, their public 
image, or a successful business with a recognized mark, and others 
should not be able to unfairly profit from these efforts by free riding. 
This unjust enrichment approach, however, cannot justify a differential 
treatment of commercial speech and noncommercial speech when the 
use is otherwise for profit. Nor does it sufficiently distinguish for-profit 
from not-for-profit uses. 
The unjust enrichment rationale is shared across all areas of IP. In the 
only right of publicity case to reach the Supreme Court, Zacchini v. 
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., the Court emphasized this point: 
“The rationale for [protecting the right of publicity] is the straightfor-
ward one of preventing unjust enrichment by the theft of good will. No 
social purpose is served by having the defendant get free some aspect of 
the plaintiff that would have market value for which he would normally 
 
261 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 572–73, 583, 592 (1994) 
(noting that the publisher objected at least in part to tarnishment of Roy Orbison’s image and 
his song); MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 181–82 (2d Cir. 1981) (stating that the record 
label objected to sexually explicit use of copyrighted song); Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pi-
rates, 581 F.2d 751, 753 (9th Cir. 1978) (noting that plaintiff objected to use of Disney char-
acters in unwholesome context); Browne, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1130–33 (allowing copyright 
and Lanham Act claims to proceed for use of song in political advertisement for presidential 
candidate); supra note 260. For a discussion of such “copyright dilution,” see Jennifer E. 
Rothman, Sex Exceptionalism in Intellectual Property, 23 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 119, 145–51 
(2012). 
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pay.”262 The free-riding concern has long been part of trademark and un-
fair competition jurisprudence. In International News Service v. Associ-
ated Press, the Supreme Court held that there could be liability for 
“reaping” where one had not “sown,” at least under limited circumstanc-
es in which the value of the plaintiff’s work would be destroyed by an-
other’s use.263 This free-riding doctrine has been narrowly cabined, but it 
still percolates up in a variety of ways in IP (and quasi-IP) law.264 Simi-
lar language has been used to justify the application of copyright laws 
when an entity fails to pay a customary fee for a use.265 
These expressed sentiments fit with a moral instinct that if a user 
makes money from the use of another person’s work, identity, or trade-
mark, the original author, identity-holder, or markholder should receive 
some of the profits. Outside the courtroom, authors of copyrighted 
works seem to share this view. Most users of the alternative licenses for 
copyrighted works issued by Creative Commons opt for licenses that do 
not allow commercial uses of their works without permission (and likely 
payment), but that do allow such uses in noncommercial contexts.266 So 
at least some authors—even ones that are more permissive of uses of 
their works and therefore seek out Creative Commons licenses—think 
there is something different about commercial (as in for-profit) uses of 
their work. This likely is driven by a sense that commercial users can, 
and therefore should, pay for the use. 
 
262 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977) (alteration in origi-
nal) (quoting Harry Kalven Jr., Privacy in Tort Law: Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 
L. & Contemp. Probs. 326, 331 (1966)). 
263 248 U.S. 215, 239–42 (1918). 
264 See, e.g., Reed Constr. Data Inc. v. McGraw-Hill Cos., 745 F. Supp. 2d 343, 353 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (allowing misappropriation claim to proceed in context of construction 
news); see also Shyamkrishna Balganesh, “Hot News”: The Enduring Myth of Property in 
News, 111 Colum. L. Rev. 419 (2011) (discussing the evolution and cabining of the hot-
news misappropriation doctrine). See generally Mark Lemley, Property, Intellectual Proper-
ty, and Free Riding, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1031 (2005) (criticizing the goal of preventing free-
riding in the context of IP laws). 
265 See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985); 
see also supra note 148.  
266 See Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright Law, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 485, 565 
(2004). The Creative Commons does not provide a definition of what is meant by “commer-
cial.” The organization commissioned a study of what “noncommercial” means to online us-
ers and determined that the bulk of respondents define a “commercial” use as any use for 
which “payment was received,” even if no profit was ultimately made. See Creative Com-
mons, Defining “Noncommercial”: A Study of How the Online Population Understands 
“Noncommercial Use” 11–12 (2009). 
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Unjust enrichment may provide some guidance on appropriate reme-
dies, as I will discuss in Part IV, but it does not establish a workable 
framework for determining liability at the outset. A person can be un-
justly enriched without necessarily financially profiting from something, 
for example, by receiving public accolades for something that did not 
originate with the copier or by enjoying another’s work without paying 
for it. We also must tolerate some uses of others’ works, identities, and 
marks without payment in order to allow continued creative output. The 
difficult question is: When does a use fall into the “unjust” rather than 
the “just” enrichment category?267  
Copyright scholars have often and rightly noted that there is truly 
nothing new under the sun and that the copyright system must provide 
great latitude to build off others’ works that have come before. Consider 
the best-selling erotic fiction, Fifty Shades of Grey. The kernel of the 
book began as fan fiction responding to the distinctly chaste hit Twilight 
series.268 Was E.L. James unjustly enriched by having based her initial 
fan fiction on the prior series (which itself could hardly be thought of as 
wholly original)? Compare Robin Thicke and Pharrell Williams’s 
Blurred Lines with Marvin Gaye’s Got to Give It Up. A jury recently 
held that Blurred Lines infringed Gaye’s song and awarded the plaintiffs 
$7.4 million, but the judge in the case has deferred judgment and many 
experts think the case (if it does not settle) may ultimately resolve either 
after a new trial or on appeal in Thicke and Williams’s favor.269 Even if 
upon further review the two songs are held not sufficiently similar for 
 
267 Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment § 42 (2011) (noting that unjust 
enrichment analysis simply “beg[s] the question” of underlying IP issues, such as whether a 
use is fair or not).  
268 See Jason Boog, The Lost History of Fifty Shades of Grey, Galleycat (Nov. 21, 2012, 8:23 
PM), http://www.mediabistro.com/galleycat/fifty-shades-of-grey-wayback-machine_b49124, ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/VNF7-78NZ. 
269 See Order Deferring Entry of Judgment, Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. CV13-
06004 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2015); Steve Gorman, “Blurred Lines” Duo to Contest $7.4 Million 
Plagiarism Verdict, 24 WestLaw J. Intell. Prop. 2 (Mar. 18, 2015); Editorial, “Blurred Lines”: 
How Many Tunes are “Blurred”?, L.A. Times, Mar. 12, 2015, at A16, available at 
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-blurred-lines-copyright-20150312-story.html 
(criticizing jury verdict); Jon Caramanica, A Verdict Based on an Old Way of Making Music, 
N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 2015, at C1 (same); Robert Fink, Blurred Lines, Ur-Lines, and Color 
Lines, Musicology Now (Mar. 15, 2015), http://musicologynow.ams-
net.org/2015/03/blurred-lines-ur-lines-and-color-line.html (criticizing use and testimony of 
musicologists); Tim Wu, Why the “Blurred Lines” Copyright Verdict Should Be Thrown 
Out, New Yorker (Mar. 12, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/why-the-
blurred-lines-copyright-verdict-should-be-thrown-out. 
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copyright infringement, or Blurred Lines is deemed sufficiently trans-
formative to merit a fair use defense, it is still reasonable to conclude 
that Thicke and Williams’s song benefited tremendously from Gaye’s 
work without providing Gaye’s estate any credit or payment.270 Some 
might think this unjust, others an appropriate and common aspect of the 
music industry.271 This example highlights the difficulty of using com-
merciality as the basis for the unjust enrichment analysis. The act of bor-
rowing, stealing or paying homage (depending on one’s point of view) is 
the act that should be judged as just or unjust rather than the subsequent 
sale of the derivative work. Blurred Lines should be evaluated as just or 
unjust regardless of whether it is sold and regardless of whether it be-
comes a big commercial hit. 
IP laws often allow and even encourage free-riding when it is decided 
as a matter of policy that we would prefer to have second-comers pro-
duce works, refer to others’ trademarks, practice inventions, or evoke 
public personalities. In the context of trademark law, the ability to use 
others’ marks facilitates the ability to adequately describe and compare 
products, and to disseminate products that are free from copyright or pa-
tent protection. When works are no longer protected by copyright or pa-
tent law, we seek to promote their copying even if others reap where 
they have not sown.272 
To the extent one thinks that commercial uses are unfair precisely be-
cause of the financial profiting from another’s labors, it may suggest that 
some form of reasonable licensing fee or royalty payment based on sales 
would be a more appropriate remedy than injunctive relief.273 This is an 
ex post facto question, however, and should not determine as a prelimi-
nary matter whether a use is infringing. Moreover, it is sometimes diffi-
cult to figure out in advance whether a financial gain is intended (for ex-
 
270 Thicke has conceded to being influenced by Gaye’s song. See Caramanica, supra note 269. 
271 See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, From J.C. Bach to Hip Hop: Musical Borrowing, Copy-
right and Cultural Context, 84 N.C. L. Rev. 547 (2006).  
272 See, e.g., Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003) (al-
lowing dissemination of edited version of public-domain work without requiring attribution 
of original creators); TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001) (al-
lowing use of similar dual-spring system on road signs once patent had expired); Kellogg 
Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938) (allowing use of “shredded wheat” to describe 
a competing product once patent on cereal expired).  
273 See Jane C. Ginsburg, Fair Use for Free or Permitted-But-Paid?, 29 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 
1383 (2014). 
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ample, in the context of fan fiction that becomes so popular that com-
mercialization is encouraged) or if a use will be profitable. 
Nor is there anything intrinsic to noncommercial uses that make them 
less threatening to copyright holders. Is distributing a Harry Potter lexi-
con free of charge and without any economic or profit motive to fans 
worldwide more worthy of protection because of its nonprofit status than 
is one that is sold for profit?274 Or should the legitimacy of such a lexi-
con stand or fall on other concerns such as the scope of the derivative-
works right and how much of Rowling’s copyrighted materials are used? 
If J.K. Rowling deserves the exclusive right to control how Harry Potter 
terminology and information is disseminated (which she does not), why 
should it matter whether money is made off of doing so or not? The 
harm to her dignitary and economic interests will be the same regardless. 
Right of publicity cases also highlight some of the challenges of using 
commerciality as the dividing line between legitimate and illegitimate 
uses. Consider the successful (though controversial) claim that the sale 
of busts of Martin Luther King, Jr., infringed the dead civil rights lead-
er’s right of publicity.275 Many (likely most) people who purchased the 
busts wanted to indicate (and celebrate) their support of Martin Luther 
King, Jr.’s, advocacy of racial equality. How do we decide which uses of 
King’s identity are just and which are unjust? Justice Weltner, who con-
curred in the decision by the Georgia Supreme Court that the use was in-
fringing, questioned the specifics of the majority’s decision for exactly 
this reason. Weltner thought the majority’s financial gain standard was 
unworkable. He proposed a series of hypotheticals that all implicate fi-
nancial gain to demonstrate that even when there is financial gain we 
might wish to allow certain uses, making that standard not a helpful one 
for determining where to draw the line. Weltner’s examples include a 
child winning a twenty-five dollar prize for the best essay on Dr. King’s 
life, the same essay being printed in a newspaper sold to the public, the 
same child making a bust of Dr. King for a monetary prize, that bust be-
ing displayed in the newspaper, and finally the use of the same bust for 
various fundraising activities at the child’s school or being used by the 
 
274 Cf. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 553–54 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008) (enjoining for-profit Harry Potter lexicon). 
275 See Martin Luther King, Jr. Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc., 296 
S.E.2d 697, 703 (Ga. 1982); see also Volokh, supra note 81, at 909–10 (criticizing the deci-
sion). 
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nonprofit UNICEF in its holiday cards.276 The sole purpose in each in-
stance is not to financially profit, but it certainly is one of the interests. 
How do we balance the King estate’s interests in controlling all uses and 
garnering all profits from those of the public and other entities in using 
(even for purposes of financial gain) King’s identity? Commerciality 
does not provide an adequate basis for distinction among these uses. 
Across the areas of IP law, commerciality turns out not to be a good 
determinant of the dividing line between just and unjust uses of others’ 
IP. Commercial uses can be “just” and noncommercial ones “unjust.” 
Because we can consider things like substitutability, market harm, moti-
vation, and transformativeness independently of commerciality, there is 
little reason to rely on commerciality as a secondary indicator of these 
primary concerns. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS 
The current treatment of commerciality in IP law is confusing, inade-
quately supported, and in need of reform. Given the confusion over the 
role of commerciality in IP laws, as well as the unsatisfying justifica-
tions for distinguishing uses on the basis of commerciality, it is time to 
reconsider reliance on commercial distinctions in IP laws. As the pre-
ceding discussion demonstrates, IP laws would not unconstitutionally 
restrict speech by doing so. Far from it—IP laws would continue to op-
erate as lawfully sanctioned speech restrictions. To the extent we wish to 
retain some distinctions based on commerciality, what we mean by 
“commercial” in a given circumstance must be clearly defined, uniform-
ly applied within a given body of law, and based on some convincing 
reason for disfavoring (or sometimes favoring) one type of use over an-
other. 
The possible paths to reform are many, and there is likely to be disa-
greement about the best way out of this morass. My goal in this final 
Part is to suggest some implications that flow from the foregoing analy-
sis, but by doing so I do not intend to present a singular or complete vi-
sion of a single path forward. Instead, I provide several insights and po-
tential directions the law could take. I begin by providing several 
observations that range across all areas of IP, and then provide some 
specific insights as to each area of IP. 
 
276 Martin Luther King, Jr. Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc., 296 S.E.2d at 707–09 (Weltner, J., 
concurring).  
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First, commercial speech can be valuable, contributing to our market-
place of ideas and our cultural and expressive storehouse. It has not been 
demonstrated that such speech is more likely to be harmful to the inter-
ests of IP holders than is noncommercial speech. Nor need we fall back 
on using commercial speech to indicate likely harms when we can di-
rectly consider such harms. Blind adherence to the disfavoring (or ex-
clusion) of commercial speech when considering speech-based defenses 
underprotects valuable contributions to the marketplace of ideas, and 
places at risk uses rooted in the liberty interests of the owners and cus-
tomers of commercial enterprises. At the same time, giving unthinking 
preference and exemptions to noncommercial speech can threaten many 
of the interests sought to be protected by IP laws. Noncommercial 
speech can cause market harm, confuse consumers, be unjust, and injure 
dignitary interests. 
Nevertheless, the commercial speech doctrine currently is in place 
and provides one possible avenue to limit some of the excesses of poten-
tially broad IP laws like dilution and the right of publicity that threaten 
speech that many (including myself) think deserve strong First Amend-
ment protection. If we choose to use the commercial speech doctrine to 
contain these laws, we should do so with full awareness that reliance on 
the doctrine comes with some pitfalls. Additionally, the definition of 
commercial speech in the context of IP laws should be more clearly de-
lineated and should ideally be limited to advertising for products or ser-
vices that are offered for sale and that do not qualify themselves as non-
commercial speech (such as movies or books). This clarification would 
avoid many (though certainly not all) of the definitional challenges that 
have plagued IP cases, particularly those involving the use of titles and 
advertisements for expressive works, such as movies and books. Such a 
clarification also would exclude corporate speech not directly aimed at 
selling particular products or services, but instead that is aimed at politi-
cal or other public debates. 
A second overarching point that flows from my analysis is that there 
is inadequate support for distinguishing for-profit and not-for-profit us-
es. Constitutional law does not justify differentiating uses on the basis of 
for-profit status when they do not qualify as commercial speech. Nor has 
a compelling case been made that commercial uses are less valuable or 
more harmful than their nonprofit counterparts. To the extent that con-
sideration of whether a use is commercial—in the sense of being for-
profit—is being used as an informational shortcut or proxy for other 
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considerations (such as likely market harm), we need not rely on such a 
proxy. More targeted and direct inquiries, such as (in the copyright con-
text) whether the use is substitutionary or transformative, are available. 
If we want to create clear-cut safe harbors, they could turn on limited 
distribution, rather than on commerciality; for example, there is a big 
difference between disseminating a work on the Internet and sharing it 
with your Trademarks class or a small group of friends and family. If we 
continue to consider for-profit status, it should be one of several consid-
erations, but should never be dispositive of liability nor a basis for re-
moving First Amendment or other free-speech-based defenses. 
To the extent we retain distinctions between for-profit and not-for-
profit uses, it may also make sense to distinguish acquisition of rights 
and defenses to liability from additional supports or exemptions that fa-
vor noncommercial uses. Although I have called into question the disfa-
voring of commercial uses, there may still be room for subsidizing some 
not-for-profit uses. In copyright law, for example, we might continue to 
find it appropriate to give a leg up to organizations and individuals that 
are unlikely to be able to pay to license various works (because they are 
not generating income) or will be particularly susceptible to the chilling 
effect produced by statutory damages and legal costs. Currently, this as-
sessment has been made in the context of educational institutions and 
their employees; to facilitate the assertion of fair use by these entities, 
the Copyright Act provides remittance from the statutory damages pro-
vision.277 Despite these possibilities, the foregoing analysis suggests that 
we should first consider why a broader exemption—one not rooted in 
commerciality—would not work. If we want to facilitate assertions of 
fair use by scholars or those who are underfunded, for example, we 
could do so without automatically tying such evaluations to nonprofit 
status. For-profit documentary filmmakers, for example, may need more 
support from the copyright system than a well-endowed nonprofit like 
the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. 
Finally, remedies may address some concerns about the possible im-
pact of removing or reducing considerations of commerciality in IP 
laws. Infringing uses that are sold for profit may be more likely to have 
higher damages awarded against them because profits can be recovered, 
and in some instances the market harm will be greater if there is wide-
spread distribution, something that often (though not always) comes 
 
277 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2)(i) (2012). 
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with commercial distribution. In right of publicity cases, a particular 
plaintiff’s aversion to advertising could also result in a higher award for 
dignitary harm.278 
In addition to these broad implications, there are also a number of 
more specific implications for each area of law. 
A. Trademark Law 
One primary object of any reform of the Lanham Act should be to 
provide clarity as to the meaning and scope of the Act. In doing so, the 
primary goal of preventing confusion as to source, sponsorship, or affili-
ation should be recognized without regard to for-profit status or whether 
a use takes place in commercial speech. The Lanham Act must continue 
to be limited by the Commerce Clause, but outside this constitutional re-
striction there is no reason to limit trademark laws to commercial speech 
or even to commercial uses. The acquisition of trademark protection 
should continue to be provided without regard to commerciality. The 
key inquiry for protectability should be public distribution of the mark 
and public associations with that mark as a particular source of a service 
or product (even if that service or product is not sold, or is sold by a 
nonprofit). Infringement and dilution actions should be able to proceed 
against noncommercial speech and not-for-profit uses because the rele-
vant harms—confusion and dilution—are possible without regard to 
commerciality. Clarifying this broad view of the scope of the Lanham 
Act would resolve the vast confusion on the topic and make the law 
more predictable and coherent across (and within) the federal circuits. 
If dilution law remains on the books (which is likely), then limits oth-
er than those rooted in commerciality should be considered. Although 
current commercial speech doctrine might permit some latitude to limit 
dilution law to commercial speech, such limits are not required. An al-
ternative speech-protective approach that might have a broader effect is 
to explicitly require that a defendant use a similar mark as an actual 
trade name. Some have claimed that dilution law currently does this, but 
not all courts have agreed and the language of the statute is ambigu-
 
278 See Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 1992) (allowing sing-
er, who refused to license his music for advertising, to recover for dignitary and economic 
harms).  
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ous.279 Limiting dilution to use as a mark would largely dispense with 
the need to specifically exempt entertainment works. The foregoing 
analysis suggests that it may be appropriate to strike the exception for 
noncommercial uses from the dilution provision of the Lanham Act, but 
the descriptive and nominative fair use defenses and the parody and 
news-based exceptions would continue to provide defenses. 
Let’s reconsider the example of Michael Jordan’s lawsuit against the 
supermarkets that placed congratulatory one-page spreads in a Sports Il-
lustrated issue celebrating his Hall of Fame induction. Both Sports Illus-
trated and the supermarkets should be capable of being held liable for 
false endorsement. It makes no sense to exempt the magazine from the 
Lanham Act, since likely confusion as to endorsement would be harmful 
to consumers and to Jordan.280 The justifications behind trademark law 
direct us to include such noncommercial speech, as well as uses that are 
not directed at financial gain, within the Lanham Act’s purview. If a 
nonprofit Chicago health clinic places a similar spread in the magazine 
that is confusing as to sponsorship, similar harms arise. Perhaps the clin-
ic performs abortions that Jordan opposes, or a patient decides to go 
there because she thinks Jordan endorsed the place and then suffers a se-
vere injury as a result of malpractice. The primary consideration in each 
instance should be whether the use is likely to cause confusion as to Jor-
dan’s endorsement. 
If such confusion is established, then a variety of other considerations 
should govern free speech concerns. Such concerns need not turn on 
commerciality. Noncommercial speech should not get a free pass, nor 
should commercial speech be denied speech-protective defenses. For 
example, the question of whether the confusion is likely to be material to 
consumers, that is, whether it would affect their purchasing choices, 
does not turn on commerciality.281 Other considerations could focus on 
 
279 See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Trademark Use Requirement in Dilution 
Cases, 24 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 541 (2008) (contending (and advocating) 
that dilution law requires a defendant to use another’s mark as its own mark or trade name 
for liability to attach). 
280 Because of the traditional news and sports coverage by the magazine, consumers might 
not be likely to think Jordan endorsed the issue. On the other hand, because the commemora-
tive issue is very different from the typical Sports Illustrated issue, consumers might well 
think that Jordan’s permission was required. 
281 Materiality has been a frequently advocated approach to reigning in some of the ex-
cesses of trademark law. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Mark Mckenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 
62 Stan. L. Rev. 413 (2010) (advocating for adding a materiality evaluation); Tushnet, supra 
note 54, at 1344–74. 
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the likely motivation of the use—was the use motivated primarily by an 
interest in exploiting Jordan’s identity to generate sales, or were there 
other communicative, informational aspects that were sought to be pro-
moted? Although the former may be more likely in pure commercial ad-
vertising, the law need not be limited to commercial advertising, as this 
would leave nonprofit organizations and the public underprotected from 
confusing uses of nonprofits’ marks, as well as underprotected from 
confusing uses by nonprofits. 
When evaluating speech-protective defenses, courts should also con-
sider whether an excessive amount of another’s mark was used. This 
tracks the nominative fair use analysis which does not turn on commer-
cial status. If a defendant cannot easily identify the product or service 
without using the mark, uses only a reasonably necessary amount of the 
mark to identify the product or service, and does nothing to suggest 
sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder, then the use 
should be deemed fair without regard to whether the use is commercial 
speech (or for profit).282 
Courts also should recognize that commercial users have expressive 
interests of their own. For example, in the context of the Whimsic Alley 
store that sells wizardry merchandise and organizes wizardry parties, the 
fact that the store financially profits from the sale of various merchan-
dise or services should not determine the legitimacy of its actions. There 
should be First Amendment review of such claims even if they are for 
profit, and even if they are deemed commercial speech. Due respect 
should be given to the fact that Whimsic Alley’s use of Harry Potter-
related references and costumes furthers its owner’s and employees’ and 
customers’ expressive interests; these interests are not diminished by the 
fact that the owner and employees have turned their avocation into a vo-
cation. To the extent that we want to distinguish the store’s parties from 
a backyard birthday party, its for-profit status should not be the decisive 
dividing line. Private parties will not meet the use in commerce require-
ment under the Commerce Clause. Additionally, various privacy inter-
ests would weigh against enforcement of even state trademark laws. 
This would hold true for a party in a public park as well as in a private 
home, because it could still be considered a zone of privacy—limited to 
a circle of friends and family. The small-scale use without public distri-
 
282 See New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 307–08 (9th Cir. 
1992). 
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bution could also be deemed either de minimis or simply as falling out-
side the purview of state laws because of the lack of distribution.283 
B. Copyright 
Copyright laws should continue to award copyright protection without 
regard to whether works are developed for commercial exploitation. 
Some scholars have recently contended that this basic premise should be 
altered, claiming that works without “independent commercial value” 
should not get the automatic benefit of copyright protection and authors 
of such noncommercial works should get fewer rights.284 The preceding 
analysis demonstrates that there is no justification for treating creators 
who do not wish to commercially profit from their works as second-
class copyright citizens who should have fewer rights to control uses of 
their works. Authors (whether they directly seek commercial recom-
pense or not) are still incentivized to produce works by the copyright 
system and also have dignitary interests that should be protected by cop-
yright laws. 
On the other end of the spectrum, some scholars have suggested that, 
rather than favor commercial works in the acquisition of copyright pro-
tection, we should disfavor uses that are primarily driven by financial 
motives. In particular, some have advocated for denying or reducing 
copyright protection for advertising, contracts, financial prospectuses, 
labels, and other “commercial information works.”285 Yet, as the analy-
 
283 See, e.g., Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 14202, 14245 (Deering 2015) (requiring use to in-
volve sale, distribution, or advertising).  
284 Pamela Samuelson et al., The Copyright Principles Project: Directions for Reform, 25 
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1175, 1198–1202, 1208–15, 1230–31 (2010); see also Sprigman, supra 
note 266, at 491 (suggesting that we “filter [out of copyright system] commercially valueless 
works”).  
285 Alfred C. Yen, Commercial Speech Jurisprudence and Copyright in Commercial In-
formation Works, 58 S.C. L. Rev. 665 (2007) (using the commercial speech doctrine to sup-
port his argument); see also Lisa Ramsey, Intellectual Property Rights in Advertising, 12 
Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 189, 217–23 (2006) (contending that advertising does not 
need the incentive benefits that copyright provides). Yen’s commercial speech analysis 
seems to run in the opposite direction from current Supreme Court analysis in which infor-
mational commercial speech is preferred over persuasive speech because of the value of in-
formation (like ingredients or pricing) to consumers. See, e.g., Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. 
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976); see also Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling 
Fair Uses, 77 Fordham L. Rev. 2537, 2601–02 (2009) (claiming that courts should not disfa-
vor fair use in the advertising context solely on the basis of “commerciality,” given the Su-
preme Court’s First Amendment decisions protecting commercial speech because of its in-
formation value for consumers). 
COPYRIGHT © 2015, VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION  
2006 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 101:1929 
sis in Section III.B demonstrates, advertising and other commercial 
works contribute valuable information and expression. Copyright law’s 
primary objective of promoting progress through incentivizing the pro-
duction of creative works is furthered by both commercial speech and 
for-profit uses. Its secondary goals of rewarding authors’ labor and pro-
tecting their personhood interests also are furthered without regard to 
whether creators are producing commercial speech or for-profit works. 
Accordingly, if commercial works are sufficiently original, they sit with-
in the heartland of copyright. 
In the context of liability for using others’ works, fair use and other 
explicit exemptions to copyright liability could be recalibrated to deem-
phasize or eliminate considerations of commerciality. Fair use need not 
focus on whether a use is for profit, but instead on whether a particular 
use is substitutionary, and also whether it is transformative (thereby con-
tributing something new to our cultural storehouse that is less likely to 
interfere with the market for the initial work).286 Preferred categories for 
fair use could continue to be identified—such as educational uses, com-
mentary, criticism, and news—but the preference should not automati-
cally turn on nonprofit status. Copyright has already largely moved in 
this direction after Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music and that decision’s 
clarification that commercial uses are not presumptively unfair.287 
Specific statutory exemptions also could shift to focus on whether a 
use in a preferred category, like education or libraries, is fulfilling the 
mission of an educational institution or library, rather than on whether it 
is a commercial enterprise. Exemptions to the DMCA anti-
circumvention provisions also could focus more on categories not rooted 
in commerciality. Exceptions for good faith assertions of fair use and for 
 
286 It is important to recognize that transformative uses are not only those that are literally 
altered, but also those put to a new purpose,. See Jennifer E. Rothman, Copyright’s Private 
Ordering and the “Next Great Copyright Act,” 29 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1595, 1644–45 
(2014). Nontransformative uses should also at times be recognized as fair. See Rothman, su-
pra note 173, at 492 (advocating for valuing some nontransformative uses); Rebecca Tush-
net, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves 
It, 114 Yale L.J. 535 (2004) (advocating for providing fair use for a variety of nontransform-
ative uses). 
287 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591–93 (1994); Cambridge 
Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1261–68 (11th Cir. 2014) (rejecting fair use even in 
the context of nonprofit educational uses in part because of the likely market harm); Neil 
Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 715, 736–43 
(2011) (describing the dominance of evaluations of transformativeness in the post-Campbell 
v. Acuff-Rose era). 
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documenting reality—whether in news, literature, or film (whether fic-
tion or documentary)—make more sense than limiting allowable cir-
cumvention to nonprofit contexts.288 
C. Right of Publicity 
The initial acquisition of the right of publicity should not turn on the 
economic value of the underlying identity-holder. Identity-holders, 
whether they are public figures or not, or have prior commercial value or 
not, are all capable of suffering both dignitary and economic harms from 
uses of their identities. The use of Facebook subscribers’ names and im-
ages to endorse products without their permission should fall within the 
scope of right of publicity claims even though the subscribers do not 
have independently valuable personas. Although for some, maybe even 
many, the dignitary injuries will be greater if their identity is used with-
out permission in commercial advertising, dignitary harms also flow 
from uses outside commercial advertising. Similarly, economic harms 
can stem from both commercial and noncommercial speech. Thus, the 
motivations behind the right of publicity are not circumscribed to the 
commercial advertising context, even though some of the first cases to 
challenge the appropriation of identity arose in the context of advertising 
and product packaging.289 
Nevertheless, because of the right of publicity’s potentially vast threat 
to free speech, current commercial speech doctrine may provide a poten-
tial avenue for cabining the right. Even if the right of publicity is limited 
to commercial advertising, it does not mean that there should be no First 
Amendment scrutiny of such uses of a person’s identity. Such uses can 
be truthful, informative, and expressive, and some latitude to use others’ 
identities should be provided even in the context of advertising. If the 
right of publicity is not limited to commercial speech, it should not oth-
erwise be limited only to for-profit uses. There is no constitutional basis 
to distinguish for-profit and nonprofit uses of another’s identity, and 
there are only very weak normative arguments for distinguishing the 
two. 
 
288 Elsewhere I have advocated greater latitude for individuals to document their lived ex-
periences, which include engagement with IP. See Rothman, supra note 173.  
289 See, e.g., Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905); Roberson v. 
Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902).  
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Returning to some of the examples from the Introduction, the uses of 
Michael Jordan’s identity and those of the Harry Potter characters 
should not automatically be right of publicity violations simply because 
the uses are classified as commercial speech. There are strong First 
Amendment defenses in each instance. The supermarkets were express-
ing a congratulatory sentiment with regard to Jordan’s induction into the 
Hall of Fame, a use that was truthful, limited in scope, and a matter of 
public concern. Similarly, even though Whimsic Alley was selling mer-
chandise with the actors’ images in its store and having its own staff and 
independent guests dress up as their favorite characters from the movie, 
these uses are related to an expressive purpose and involve engagement 
with lawfully purchased merchandise and characters that have cultural 
and personal import. 
CONCLUSION 
The chaos created in intellectual property law by relying on commer-
ciality as a dividing line for liability suggests that the reverberations 
from the commercial speech doctrine go further than many have 
thought. Even if the commercial speech doctrine remains in place, it 
should not be imported to other fields, such as intellectual property, 
without appreciating that the doctrine is being asked to do work that it 
cannot do, and that the ultimate goals sought to be achieved would often 
be better served by alternative frames that do not focus on commerciali-
ty. 
It is not that there is never a reason to treat nonprofit organizations or 
corporations differently, or to distinguish commercial from noncommer-
cial speech, but instead that one must hone in on exactly why and when 
we should do so. Simply putting the scarlet word “commercial” on uses 
cannot be the justification for different protection or liability. 
For those concerned about trying to limit the ever-expansive reach of 
intellectual property laws, the commercial speech doctrine and commer-
ciality more broadly have sometimes seemed like attractive loci for cab-
ining the excesses of intellectual property law. Such an approach, how-
ever, is not always the best way to address our speech concerns. In most 
instances, more direct inquiries would better serve the underlying inter-
ests of each body of intellectual property law. Even if dilution law and 
right of publicity law opt (or continue) to employ the commercial speech 
doctrine as a limiting principle, we should clearly define what we mean 
by the term—ideally circumscribing it to advertising for specific prod-
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ucts or services—and then stick clearly to these parameters. If we go 
down this path, we should nevertheless retain ample speech protections 
even for commercial speech. 
Although I have not directly challenged the legitimacy of the com-
mercial speech doctrine, the challenges that commercial speech juris-
prudence presents for the intellectual property field provide additional 
fuel to arguments that the commercial speech doctrine stands on unsta-
ble ground. Being clearer about when and why commerciality matters 
(and when and why it does not) in intellectual property law may provide 
guidance about how to move forward with (or away from) the commer-
cial speech doctrine elsewhere. 
